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Radicalisation is a problem to which no country is immune. It is a dramatic shift in 
behaviour and attitude that carries undesirable consequences such as the breakdown 
of families, communities, and democracies – with the ultimate consequence being 
terrorism.   
The growing concern of Islamic radicalisation and the impact it can possibly have 
underscores the focus of the current study. It also speaks to issues around religious 
freedom and the broader fight against terrorism. It will be looking into the commonly 
cited causes of radicalisation and the psychological processes involved in an 
individual’s path to radicalism.  
The research was approached from a constructionist orientation meaning that 
individuals shape their reality based on their beliefs and interactions with other people 
and the world. The study examines radicalisation within a paradigm focused on a 
combination of criminological and psychological principles, to produce a 
contextualised study on Islamic radicalisation. Case studies from South Africa and the 
United Kingdom will be assessed with the theoretical frameworks of Moghaddam’s 
Staircase to Terrorism (2005) and the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) to 
demonstrate the universality of the phenomenon of radicalisation.  
The study rests on the idea of instrumental rationality found in rational choice theory 
with the objective of assessing South Africa’s risk to radicalisation based on micro 
and macro factors.  
 
The research found that the factors, which result in radicalisation, are many and 
complex, and may not be reduced to a single cause. Although one factor that seems to 
play a very significant role is identity, more specifically the need to belong, be 
accepted and to have a purpose. In other words, the radical religious ideology 
provides vocabulary and a bolstered identity, whereas politics provide the stimulus. 
The ideology of the group is not as important as what the group is offering the 
individual in terms of acceptance and a platform for expression. This study, as 
previously stated is about Islamism due to global concern, although it could have been 
about any radical organisation or movement.  
It is recommended that discussions about religion, identity, foreign policy and politics 
be encouraged especially amongst younger people. These discussions should not be 
	 v	
weakened by political correctness, or when a radical view is expressed, the fear of 
censure. All ideologies are, and should be open to questioning and investigation.  
The researcher understands that this topic may be misunderstood – implying that there 
is a heightened risk posed by specific groups. It is hoped that the substance of the 
study will prove otherwise, with the researcher maintaining a secular view 
throughout.  
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In accord with the historical chronicle of human atrocities: It requires conducive 
social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious deeds. Given 
appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do 
extraordinarily cruel things. 
(Bandura, 1999, p.200) 
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1. CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
Islamist terrorism is a problem worldwide – the United States, France, Copenhagen, 
Baghdad, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan are a few of the many places which have 
experienced cases of Islamist inspired violence in 2015 alone.  Given the nature of 
radicalisation and terrorism, no country should be considered immune. As Defence 
and Military Veterans Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula said “The truth is South 
African young people are being recruited by Isis (the Islamic State), and the reality is 
we must be vigilant – we must be alert” (Hans & Stolley, 2015).  Echoing this 
sentiment is Police Minister Nkosinathi Nhleko, who stated “In today’s terms, there is 
no country in the world that is not vulnerable when it comes to issues of terrorism” 
(Merton, 2015).  
 
This study will be organised around the following questions: What is radicalisation, 
what are the psychological processes involved in radicalisation, what makes an 
individual vulnerable to radicalisation, what the causal factors that could contribute to 
radicalisation among Muslims in South Africa are. The objective is to analyse South 
Africa’s risk to radicalisation based on micro and macro factors – from the individual, 
to the social and to the structural.  It is better to study the phenomenon of 
radicalisation in this way, as all individuals have a different path towards 
radicalisation, and no pattern or profile can be applied universally (Aly, 2012). The 
study will be approached from a constructionist orientation and rely on the content 
analysis of four case studies from South Africa and the United Kingdom, as applied to 
Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism model (2005) and the Velduis and Staun Root 
Cause model (2009) in order to illustrate the universality of the process of 
radicalisation. 
 
Though there is contention amongst academics with regards to the definition of 
radicalisation (Borum, 2011; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) - what can be agreed upon is 
that radicalisation is a process. The process can be viewed as socialisation leading to 
extremism, which may culminate in terrorism (Borum, 2011) – the point being, that 
one does not become a violent extremist overnight. Furthermore, not all radicals are 
terrorists, however all terrorists have gone through a process of radicalisation. 
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Essentially radicalisation is a fundamental change in a person’s belief system; 
therefore in order to understand how people progress from thoughts to action, we 
must look into what they think, and why they think it (Borum, 2011).  
 
According to Solomon (2012) modern-day terrorism is largely driven by radical 
Islamist ideology. The words ‘Islamist’ and ‘Islamism’ are used instead of ‘Islam’, 
largely because the traditional ideas of Islam (harmony and tolerance) have been 
commandeered by a “twentieth-century totalitarian ideology that seeks to serve the 
narrow political ends of domination” (Solomon, 2013, p. 18).  South Africa plays a 
large role in the global jihad network. Unfortunately many studies about radicalisation 
seem to focus on Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in North Africa (Solomon, 2013).  
 
The study of radicalisation is important, as it is often viewed as a predictor of violent 
behaviours (Aly, 2012). The following chapter will discuss literature pertinent to the 
























2.1 Radicalisation  
What goes on before the bomb goes off – (Neumann, 2008) 
 
Research with regards to radicalisation often focuses on the radicalisation and 
subsequent terrorism, which is committed by a few known terrorists (Bartlett & 
Miller, 2011). Furthermore there is contention with regards to the definition of 
radicalisation. Neumann (2013) points out two areas related to the ambiguous 
definition of radicalisation. Firstly, there is the “end-point”, meaning the culmination 
of the radicalisation process. Some believe it to be purely cognitive where the 
individual holds radical ideas about society and governance. Whereas others believe it 
should be defined as a behavioural phenomenon and be acknowledged for its aspect 
of violence. One then must consider the link, if any, between cognitive radicalisation 
and behavioural radicalisation (Neumann, 2013). The process of radicalisation often 
starts when individuals are frustrated by their lives, government policies or society. 
The typical pattern involves them meeting other like-minded individuals, and together 
they go through phases that may ultimately result in terrorism (Precht, 2007; Silber & 
Bhatt, 2007; Moghaddam 2005).  
Every individual’s path of radicalisation is different, and not all radicalised 
individuals become terrorists – however all terrorists go through a process of 
radicalisation. Therefore a distinction between radical beliefs and extremist action 
should be noted, because radical beliefs or ideologies are not necessary for violent 
action (Borum, 2011; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011; Lakhani, 2013). “There is no 
inevitable link between (extremist) political beliefs and (violent) political action, and 
[the] two phenomena should therefore be studied separately” (Neumann, 2013, 
p.879).  Cognitive radicalisation (adopting a radical viewpoint) should not be 
conflated with behavioural radicalisation (viewing and utilizing violence as a solution 
or statement) (Aly, 2012), however cognitive radicalisation is one pathway to 
behavioural radicalisation (Neumann, 2013). The second ambiguity is related to 
context and normativity. The concept of radicalisation is highly contextual and in 
most situations one would have to consider what it is radical in relation to. The 
concept of what is “radical” is dependent on what is normative. One may compare the 
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definitional ambiguities to that of terrorism however, “with terrorism, there is an 
objectively definable core—a violent tactic, sometimes a strategy, which can be 
distinguished from other means and modes of pursuing violent conflict. 
Radicalisation, by contrast, is inherently context-dependent, and its meaning will 
always be contested” (Neumann, 2013, p.878). 
Waldmann (2010) notes that the word “radicalisation” is derived from the Latin word 
radix, which means “roots”. With this understanding, one derives that a radical seeks 
to solve their problem by going to the root cause of said problem. An individual who 
may be considered radical questions the status quo and tries to replace it by means of 
reaction or revolution. These individuals act in accordance with absolute truth with 
regards to an ideology or religion and make no acceptance for restrictions or 
concessions. Radicalised individuals are not willing to hear counter-arguments or take 
into consideration the social context in which they attempt to spread their ideology. 
Essentially there are two sides – those who prescribe to the radical view (friends and 
followers) and those who do not (non-believers or enemies) (Waldmann, 2010).  
According to Bartlett and Miller (2011) being radical involves rejection of the status 
quo, not necessarily in a violent way. Radicalism comprises the possibility of violent 
action but should not be equated with violence. It is first of all a psychological 
syndrome and construct, an attitude (Waldmann, 2010, p.8). Radicalisation generally 
has two approaches – the pursuit of goals through violence, or trying to obtain far-
reaching goals in society not necessarily with the use of violence. Therefore a 
distinction is drawn between ‘radicalised’ and ‘radical’ – the latter not carrying 
negative connotations (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Lakhani, 2013). Some radicals may 
support terrorism while others do not and advise against it. In their study, Bartlett and 
Miller (2011) compared samples of violent radicals with non-violent radicals. They 
examined the following factors; political, social, and personal characteristics, 
ideology, religious concepts and beliefs, the emotional pull of joining the jihad 
(simply understood as ‘holy war’ however according to Silke (2008) it is far more 
complex. The phrase comes from the Arabic word for ‘struggle’ and there are two 
types of jihad: the Greater and the Lesser, referring to those who struggle to live a life 
of charity guided by Gods commands and those who are involved in the violent 
struggle on behalf of Islam, respectively. Those involved in the Lesser jihad are also 
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known as Mujahideen (holy warriors), adventure, status and peer pressure. Their 
results suggested that violent radicalisation is not necessarily a religious, rational, or 
intellectual choice. There seems to be an emotional pull towards joining the crusade 
against the West. It exemplifies the counter-cultural and anti-establishment traditions 
adopted by many youth subcultures. Furthermore, in-group pressure as well as the 
acquisition of respect and personal meaning seem to play a role (Bartlett & Miller, 
2011). Awan (2013) proposed that radicalisation is influenced by a culture of violence 
whereby people seek to re-enact those feelings and perceptions of anger and hate. 
Slootman and Tillie (2006) assert that young people are particularly at risk to 
radicalisation at “fracture points’ (p.51) in their life, for example the death of a family 
member.  Essentially young people desire acceptance, encouragement and confidence 
in oneself. When they lack any of these features, they may develop a negative self-
concept that changes their attitude to society. When individuals become defensive and 
rigid, they may retreat into their own groups and increase their risk of victimisation 
and alienation. According to their study radicalisation is largely limited to individuals 
between fifteen and their late twenties. The reasoning for this is that young people 
want to be accepted so discrimination and exclusion have a greater affect on them as 
opposed to older people who want to carry on with their lives. 
Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Sheveland, Hetiarachchi and Gunaratna (2014) assert 
that radicalisation involves a move towards supporting or sanctioning radical 
behaviour. Radical behaviour may be viewed as behaviour against the norm, or 
behaviour that undermines what is important or meaningful to most people. 
Radicalism is therefore seen as counter final, - meaning the behaviour may serve 
individual desires, but at a price (personally or to others) (Kruglanski et al., 2014). 
For example: a suicide bomber may attain their desire for significance or personal 
meaning (Post, 2010) by taking the lives of others.  
Wilner and Dubouloz (2011) view radicalisation as a psychological and emotional 
process, as well as a personal and interpersonal process whereby individuals embrace 
religious, political or social ideals. Furthermore, the attainment of the aforementioned 
ideals may justify the use of violence. The authors stress the importance of 
radicalisation being a learning process whereby an individual internalises and 
rationalises certain ideas. Essentially radicalisation would constitute a fundamental 
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change in one’s belief system. Furthermore it is not always negative – one could be 
radical by wanting to return to a purer form of religion. This radical behaviour 
becomes a problem when it is combined with intolerance, segregation and the 
promotion of violence. However not all individuals who radicalise – even if they 
vocally support the use of violence – partake in violent action themselves, herein lies 
the critical distinction (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011).   
Lakhani (2013) is in agreement with Wilner and Dubouloz (2011). He asserts that 
radicalisation is a process whereby individuals change their attitudes, values, beliefs 
and actions; and relinquish one worldview for another. Furthermore, this change will 
involve them going through a process whereby their perception of their social and 
personal identity will change. Al-Lami (2009) builds on this idea, viewing 
radicalisation as a gradual transition from one condition to another – a growing of 
readiness to support and pursue changes in society that may conflict with democratic 
order (Al-Lami, 2009; Slootman & Tillie, 2006).  
Slootman and Tillie (2006) expand on the idea of radicalisation in striving for changes 
in society, by speaking of it in terms of legitimacy. Radicalisation decreases 
legitimacy in a democratic society, whereby radicalised violence (extremism) is 
viewed as the antithesis of democracy. Democracy is based on ideas of equality and 
freedom, whereas extremism rejects the values of democracy and presents its own 
ideology. Legitimacy is based on the confidence citizens have in their political system 
and government - citizens need to know that their basic needs are catered for, and 
problems dealt with. Legitimacy is necessary for democracy to prosper. It is not 
necessary for all citizens to accept and display democratic values, but a large portion 
of the population should. Therefore one could look at radicalisation as “a process 
through which individuals are exposed to, and ultimately adopt, a violent ideology 
justifying attacks against the state” (Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora, 2012).  In this 
understanding, radicalisation is the process of alienating oneself form society – a 
process of de-legitimisation. The process is characterised by mistrust of the political 
and social situation, where individuals lose confidence in their government, and 
retreat to their own groups looking for a (sometimes extreme and violent) solution in 
pursuit of change. This extreme behaviour is the “polar opposite of democracy” 
(Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p.22).  
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Savun and Phillips (2009) note that states, which are actively involved in international 
politics, have the potential to create resentment abroad, becoming the targets of those 
who prefer an isolationist foreign policy. Their findings suggest that democracies are 
not necessarily more vulnerable to terrorism, it is dependent upon how they interact 
with other states in the international system – participation in crisis events, assisting 
and intervening in civil wars and alliances with the US increase a state’s vulnerability 
to transnational terrorism. 
Joffé (2011) notes that the conditions often cited for encouraging Islamic radicalism 
include social isolation, poor political and personal aspirations and unemployment. 
Precht (2007) has divided the factors which influence radicalisation into three 
categories – background, trigger and opportunity factors. Background factors consist 
of personal trauma, issues surrounding identity, discrimination, relative deprivation 
and alienation. Trigger factors are those incidents that are provocative in nature – 
unhappiness with foreign policy, a desire for activism and sometimes the presence of 
a charismatic leader. Lastly, opportunity factors include locations for individuals to 
meet like-minded people, such as Mosques, prisons, schools, cafes, universities, and 
the Internet (Precht, 2007). The difficulty lies in assessing why only some individuals 
exposed to these factors are driven to violence. Though there are many factors, which 
could contribute to the radicalisation of an individual, the reason why some are 
affected negatively and others not, is far more complex (Precht, 2007; Veldhuis & 
Staun, 2009; Joffé, 2011). 
Radicalisation can be viewed as a sociological phenomenon where issues such 
as belonging, identity, group dynamics and values are important elements in 
the transformation process. Religion plays an important role, but for some it 
rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals. A common denominator 
seems to be that the involved persons are at a cross road in their life and 
wanting a cause (Precht, 2007, p.7).  
 
Slootman and Tillie (2006) recognise that radicalisation is not “characteristic of 
‘irrational madmen’” (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p.4). In their study on the potential 
radicalisation processes of Muslims in Amsterdam, they posit two possible reasons 
for radicalisation. The first reason may be an orthodox religious stance and the second 
	 16	
being the idea that politics and society, respond and deal with matters relating to 
Muslims and Islam in a threatening or unjust fashion. The most critical conclusion 
they have drawn from their research is that the religious and political dimensions of 
radicalisation are independent of each other. In other words, orthodoxy does not 
necessarily lead to political dissatisfaction, thereby increasing the risk of 
radicalisation (Slootman & Tillie, 2006).  
 
According to Alonso, Bjørgo, Della Porta, Coolsaet, Khosrokhavar, Lohlker, 
Ranstorp, Reinares, Schmid, Silke, Taarnby and Vries (2008), one must further 
inspect the term “violent radicalisation” which encompasses embracing ideas and 
views that could lead to terrorism. This term may cause confusion as the socialisation 
does not need to be violent – furthermore committing acts of violence as well 
accepting violence as a rational option may both be construed as violent 
radicalisation. The term “radicalisation” may also be problematic in its relationship to 
“radicalism” (which is an expression of political thought – associated with left and 
right- wing political parties).  
According to Miller (2013) the words “radical”, “terrorist” and “extremist” are used 
as if they were synonymous. Furthermore, “extremist” is automatically assumed to 
infer the acceptance, encouragement and action of violence. By using the 
aforementioned concepts interchangeably one risks implying that individuals who are 
radicalised become terrorists. According to Neumann (2008, p.8) extremism may be 
defined as: 
political ideologies that are opposed to a society’s core values and principles, 
which – in the context of European liberal democracies – could be said of any 
ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core 
principles of democracy and human dignity. The expression can also be used 
to describe the methods through which political actors attempt to realise their 
aims, that is, by using means that ‘show disregard for the life, liberty, and 
human rights of others’. In the absence of a consensus, it makes sense to 
qualify the concept – where necessary – by adding the appropriate adjective, 
that is, ‘violent extremism’ or ‘ideological extremism’ 
 
According to Borum (2011) ideologies and actions are sometimes linked, not always. 
Like Neumann (2008) he argues as to whether one should separate ‘extremism’ from 
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‘violent extremism’, suggesting that the former may not be of importance to safety 
and security given its lack of support for, and encouragement of violent actions. 
Radicalisation according to Neumann (2008, p.6) is “about the change in attitude that 
may lead individuals to embrace extra-constitutional methods of bringing about 
political change, including – ultimately – the use of violence”. For the purposes of 
this study the term “radicalisation” will be understood as socialisation into extremism, 
where if it is violent extremism, it may manifest into terrorism.  
 
The feared end result of radicalisation is terrorism (violent extremism). Terrorism is a 
complex phenomenon, and can be viewed as a crisis event that is traumatic in nature 
(Waldman, Carmeli & Halevi, 2011). According to Richards (2014, p.230) “terrorism 
is the use of violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose of generating 
a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a 
political motive”, therefore terrorism can be seen as meaningful communication 
enacted through violence (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). Terrorism has existed before the 
dawn of recorded history. However there are specific trends, which have changed the 
nature and extent of the threat, such as the ease travel, and accessibility to information 
that has allowed like-minded individuals to connect and spread their extremist 
ideology (Victoroff, 2005). It is fundamentally about the systematic inducement of 
terror aimed at civilians as a means of intimidation, committed within a religious, 
political or philosophical context (Danilović & Manojlović, 2013). Terrorism may be 
viewed as a goal specific activity, and should be (regardless of its success) viewed as 
different from radicalisation. Participation in terror activities, according to Staun 
(2008) requires an active, mindful decision, as opposed to radicalisation, which is a 
gradual process without a clearly defined beginning and end.  Radicalisation is a 
process whereby the state of mind, attitude and behaviour shift, which serve a less 
specified function.  
 
There is a lack of consensus in the academic world with regards to a definition for 
terrorism. It is difficult to form a universal definition due to this phenomenon’s 
heterogeneous nature. Defining terrorism is a complex phenomenon as “Today’s 
terrorist is tomorrows freedom fighter” (Onwudiwe, 2005). One would have to take 
into account the varied assumed and stated motivations, psychopathology or lack 
thereof, as well as the point of view. However there are two universal elements. 
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Firstly, the use of violence against non-combatants/civilians, and secondly the goal of 
the perpetrator may be to influence and change a target audience’s behaviour to suit 
the terrorist (Victoroff, 2005).   
 
There is a need to discuss why ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is so successful. 
According to Coolsaet (2015) is currently one of the most successful Jihadist groups. 
He asserts that the Western media helps IS build its reputation as an unstoppable force 
by emphasizing their threat to Western world. By doing this, they are unknowingly 
increasing the appeal of IS – representing them as winners – and if one were to be a 
part of that, one would also be a winner. As mentioned earlier, there are some 
individuals who want to be known as heroes, and this image attracts many young 
fighters. He argues further that IS seems to offer a solution for any personal 
motivation and individual may have. IS offers a sense of belonging, respect, 
comradery, adventure, acknowledgment, heroism and martyrdom. There are some 
who are given an alternative to petty crime and drug use, as well as being part of a 
society that has very clear rules and roles, including moral absolutes. For others, there 
is wealth, dominance over others and perhaps even sadism all within the name of a 
higher goal.  
 
Troubled young men thereby imagine a land where they can start anew, 
commanding respect as upholders of God’s law. Unhappy women dream of 
attaining happiness for the first time – or the second or third, if husbands they 
take are lucky enough to achieve martyrdom. The fantasies ignore a very 
vicious reality, of course – but as long as thwarted personalities imagine that 
ISIS can make them true, people will kill and die in their pursuit (Kadri, 
2015). 
IS will continue to grow in strength if they maintain their territories and position in 
the media spotlight. With this understanding, they may only become more brazen and 
brutal only to guarantee attention and entice new recruits (Coolsaet, 2015). One may 
attempt to restrict travel and control propaganda, which may be counterproductive, 
because they may be actively seeking the information. Furthermore, one may also 
consider it to be a community and family issue (Kadri, 2015). According to Nawaz 
(2011) Islamism may be viewed as a social movement, an agent of change, due to its 
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main goal of spreading ideas and creating the demand for change.  Social movements 
such as Islamism depend on narratives, ideas, charismatic leaders and symbolism. By 
taking advantage of a globalized world, radical groups have developed trans-national 
identities based upon trans-national ideas and narratives. While many are stuck with a 
nation-state mind-set, these radical groups have developed an identity that is not 
based a nationality or ethnicity, but rather ideas that form loyalties between people all 
over the world – they have evolved into a global brand that appeals to the youth in 
particular (Nawaz, 2011). Like other movements, propaganda offered by Islamist 
organisation such as ISIS offer an alternative way of living, and capture the 
imaginations of their target audience. Brutality is often seen in the footage, however 
the idea of utopianism is also prevalent. Social media has become the “radical 
mosque” of the globalized world. Radicalisation generally begins offline, with online 
material serving and nurturing the curious minds. Individuals are not radicalized with 
propaganda – the propaganda concentrates an already held sympathy (Winter, 2015). 
Furthermore, the reason the Islamist narrative is successful, according to Nawaz 
(2011), is due to political correctness and the fear of challenging ideas that are in stark 
contrast to a democratic way of life. Ideas matter. But let us not forget that there are 
good ideas and bad ideas. Currently bad ideas are fighting harder for survival. Most 
who become terrorists, genuinely believe they are righteous. They dedicate their lives 
for their cause, and are fully prepared to die for it (Nawaz, 2011).  
In summation radicalisation may be viewed as a process of alienation, characterised 
by distrust of the social and political system and may view, or support acts of terror as 
a viable option.  





The central message of the radicals is that Islam is threatened and that it is the duty 
of every true believer to do something about it. Extremists think that all means are 
justified to achieve this goal (Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p.28). 
 
Kruglanski et al. (2014) assert that social bonds and ideology are related and 
important to each other. This is because some type of social bond will bring 
individuals into contact with an ideology (which is a shared reality). According to 
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Kruglanski et al. (2014) there are generally three elements, which make up a 
terrorism-justifying ideology: grievance, a culprit and an effective method (terrorism) 
of relieving the dishonour caused by said culprit. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) 
note that ideology is often seen as the driving force behind political radicalisation and 
action, however they view this as being too simplistic to fully understand the process 
of radicalisation. 
 
According to Bale (2013) there are different beliefs or perspectives with regards to the 
Islamist ideology and its role in the perpetration of jihadist violence. Firstly, there is 
the belief that ideology and religious doctrine do not effect or influence the behaviour 
of terrorists, whereby other factors such as psychology, politics and economics 
amongst other factors are responsible. The second view is that religious doctrine and 
Islamist ideology sometimes affect the behaviour of terrorists. The third, he argues, is 
that Islamist ideology and religious doctrine do affect terrorist behaviour, however it 
is best not to admit this. Nawaz (2016) takes the middle ground with regards to the 
above –  
The Crusaders weren't pious. But they had something to do with Christianity, 
right? Right? That something was the desire impious religious peasants had 
for martyrdom and the religious promise of redemption that Pope Urban II 
gave them. Now switch out white Christians with brown Muslims and kindly 
cease with this bigotry of low expectations. This has something to do with 
Islam… No terrorist represents the values of all Muslims, of course, but we 
have allowed hard-line Islamism to permeate our communities and mobilise 
the vulnerable. To stop it we have to make it less attractive, and that is a long-
term struggle, similar to those against racism, homophobia and anti-Semitism. 
So please stop denying the nature of jihadism. Please stop ignoring the 
narratives which drive these attacks. Instead of aiding extremists who insist 
Islam today is perfect, perhaps you should aid us beleaguered reformist 
Muslims who are attempting to address this crisis within Islam against all the 
odds. 
 
Slootman and Tillie (2006) summarise the convictions that characterise Islamic 
radicalisation are firstly, a perception that Islam is threatened. Secondly, 
marginalisation is partly the doing of the political elite therefore resistance to them is 
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justified, and thirdly, the religious leaders who condone this situation are guilty of 
treason to the faith. Fourthly, there must be a return to the religion through a literal 
interpretation of the Quran whereby, fifthly, this religion is viewed as superior and 
should form the basis of society and its principles. Lastly, true believers should play 
an active role in bringing about this change in society. The next three convictions take 
radicalism towards Islamic extremism- the realisation that a utopian society is the 
ideal goal; pursuing this goal by any means necessary (violence included) and the 
activists see themselves as combatants whereby the ‘enemy’ is demonised (Slootman 




The Islamist ideology is based on the premise that Muslims are falling behind the 
West because they are not ‘good’ Muslims. In order to live a fulfilling and meaningful 
life they should therefore adhere to Shari'a. Shari'a is sacred law that regulates almost 
every aspect of an individual’s life. The law can be challenging to follow as it is 
usually in contrast to Western norms and modern practice. The Islamist ideology 
seeks a life based purely on Shari'a, whilst rejecting all influences of the West 
(customs, values, politics and philosophy) (Pipes, 2000). Mozaffari (2007, p.21) 
defines Islamism as “a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose 
final aim is the conquest of the world by all means”. Timmerman, Hutsebaut, Mels, 
Nonneman and Van Herck (2007) similarly view Islamism as an ideology that aims to 
appropriate the political space by using religious resources and social action to 
orchestrate acts of terrorism. “Islam does not recognize the secular concept of 
separation between state and religion. Political Islam has two objectives which are 
closely linked: establishing solidarity with the umma and restoring Muslim political 
regimes under the authority of the Caliphate” (Joffé, 2011, p.95). 
Islamists are selective in their interpretation and choice of Islamic principles and 
sources. Furthermore Islamists see the western world as repressive and immoral as it 
does not adhere to Islamic law or principles; Islam is not the dominant political power 
and non-Muslims occupy what Muslims consider to be their territory, for example: 
Palestine and Kashmir. To rid themselves of these unwanted conditions, Islamists see 
two options. Firstly, the restoration of the world to the ‘Medina model’, in other 
words society as it was shaped by Muhammed and secondly, the establishment of a 
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Caliphate (Mozaffari, 2007). 
 
2.2.2 Salafism 
In order to understand Salafism, one must understand why modelling the Salaf 
(ancestors) is important to the Muslim population. In normative Islam the best display 
of faith was to follow the example of Muhammad. The teachings and life of 
Muhammad are of central importance to the religion of Islam. These teachings and 
way of life were mediated to the world via Muhammad’s companions and the first 
few generations of Muslims. Therefore Salafism is considered the purest and most 
esteemed form of Islam to follow (Durie, 2013).  
Jihadi-Salafism is a movement with global reach, which commenced in an armed 
struggle to defend the umma (community of believers), based on a selective 
interpretation of Islam and its history. Violence is a defining characteristic of this 
movement and like other religious movements there is internal division (Karagiannis, 
2014). Egerton (2011) advises that Salafism be understood in terms of the religious 
and the political, whereby militant Salafism can be seen as a means of defending the 
Muslim community from aggression and crimes against Islam. A lot of the Salafist 
narrative is drawn from the perceived suffering and persecution of the Muslim 
community, inflicted by the West. Many militants then see violence as a rational 
choice (Egerton, 2011).  
 
It is important to grasp that Salafism is a reform movement in the sense that it 
aims to bring Muslims back to the purity of Islam's origins. It is overtly anti-
Western to its bootstraps because it opposes everything which is not based 
upon the 'best example' of Muhammad, and it explicitly rejects appeal to 
intellectual concepts associated with western thought, whether from 
economics, education, ethics or politics (Durie, 2013).  
 
It must be noted that while there are Muslims who suffer deprivation and violence at 
the hand of non-Muslims – each situation must be evaluated in its own capacity, not 
simply reduced to blaming the West and its people. “Marshalling partial truths and 
some legitimate grievances, militant Salafists assume for all Muslims the role of 
victims, and for all non-Muslims the role of aggressor” (Egerton, 2011, p.13). There 
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are those militants who cite the religion of Islam as an explanation for their acts. The 
religion of Islam is not at fault in this regard; rather it is the misinterpretation of the 
scripture. The ayat, which militants often cite, is a misinterpretation, which occurs 
often with religious understandings that depend on historical lessons and the 
interpretation of text. The text should be read within context and with reference to the 
lesson trying to be taught. Militant Salafism is therefore informed by religion but 




Wahhabism is essentially a form of Salafism; with ‘Wahhabi’ being used a label 
mainly by non-Muslims to refer to the official religious ideology of Saudi Arabia – 
Saudi Salafism (Durie, 2013). Wahhabism is a puritanical form of Islam, with its’ 
name being derived from Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), an Islamic 
scholar. He was frustrated by the moral decline of society and encouraged a return to 
the pure and orthodox practice of Islam as stipulated by the Quran and the life of 
Prophet Muhammad (Armanios, 2003). Armanios (2003, p.1) defines Wahhabism as 
“a movement that seeks to purify the Islamic religion of any innovations or practices 
that deviate from the seventh-century teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions”.  
Many Wahhabists and Salafists do not condone or support terrorist behaviour, and 
secondly citing ideology alone as the cause for radicalisation and terrorist action is the 
idea that thoughts are the same as actions. Furthermore, ideology alone cannot be 
generalised to all forms of terrorism.  
2.2.4 The Profile of an Islamist 
Many studies on Islamic extremism have not yielded a universal profile that can be 
used to identify potential terrorists. Results have shown terrorists to be more ‘normal’ 
as opposed to pathological – anyone could be a terrorist (Al-Lami, 2009; McCauley,	
Moskalenko,	&	Van	Son, 2013). Despite the difficulties in forming a universal profile 
there are a few commonalities, one of which being that the Muslim youth involved in 
extremist violence are religious novices – they may be new to the religion, be born-
again Muslims or converts, who have a superficial understanding of Islam. Due to 
their insufficient and superficial knowledge they are unable to assess the legitimacy of 
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the interpretation of Islam they receive via religious leaders or text, which makes 
them vulnerable to radicalisation and extremist violence (Al-Lami, 2009). According 
to Roy (2008; Lynch, 2013) Islamic radicalisation is a generational phenomenon – a 
youth movement. He asserts that explanations based on poverty, integration, or racism 
are not specific enough. Accordingly he sees radicalisation as more of a psychological 
matter than a social or economic problem, because radicalisation tends to occur in 
small groups (such as friends, at a university or even prison). Furthermore he views 
the Western-based Islamic radicals as a lost generation – separated from tradition and 
culture whilst being frustrated that Western society does not meet their expectations 
(Roy, 2008). Coolsaet (2015) notes that the young foreign fighters of today are a 
product of the society they live in. He asserts that the young people of the 21st century 
experience more pressure than that of their parents approximately forty years ago. At 
a much earlier age, young people of today are have to make decisions and are given 
more choices in every aspect of life. Essentially the youth of today have demanding 
lives. They are also struggling with their identity, which has now been given the label 
of ‘teen angst’, however they have very little in terms of reference as the environment 
has changed so dramatically. 
With regards to Africa, specifically Nigeria and Boko Haram, a study by Onuoha 
(2014) suggests that unemployment, poverty, weak familial structures and illiteracy 
make young men vulnerable to radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. Travelling 
preachers communicate an extreme version of religious texts and portray the 
government as weak and dishonest – this allows armed groups to recruit and train 
vulnerable individuals. Freddes, Mann and Doosje (2015) conducted a longitudinal 
evaluation of resilience training as a means of preventing violent radicalisation. The 
sample consisted of 46 young Muslim adults (male and female) with a migrant 
background. Results showed that training significantly increased their sense of 
agency. A small increase was found in self-esteem, perspective taking, empathy, but 
also narcissism. Attitudes towards violent ideology and personal violent intentions 
decreased. These results suggest empowering individuals and bolstering their ability 
to empathise can prove to be successful in countering violent radicalisation. 
For the purposes of this paper Islamic radicalisation or Islamism will be used to refer 
to any extreme understanding/version of Islam with a violent ideology.  
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The following section will discuss various phase models and ideas about the 
processes and steps involved in radicalisation. These models will illustrate that 
although there are many ideas about the path towards radicalisation – each of these 
share commonalities that give insight into the process.  
 
2.3 Phase Models 
 
2.3.1 Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) Four Stage Model of Radicalisation 
 
Silber and Bhatt (2007) propose a four-stage model of radicalisation. The steps 
consist of pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadisation. Each 
step is unique and individuals need not follow the steps in a linear manner and they 
may abandon the process at any stage. They assert that individuals who complete the 
entire process will most likely be involved in the planning or execution of a terrorist 
act.  Pre-radicalisation is the phase before the individual is exposed to the jihadi-
Salafi ideology (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  
 
The self-identification phase is where individuals are influenced by a variety internal 
and external factors leading to the exploration of Salafi Islam. This religious seeking 
and homophile is often the result of social, political, economic or personal crises. The 
indoctrination phase is where the individuals beliefs intensify and they accept the 
radical ideology that militant jihad (holy war) is required to support their cause. 
Jihadisation is the final phase and occurs in a few months or weeks (whereas the other 
three may take years). In this phase the individual accepts their duty to participate in 
jihad, and proceed with planning, preparation and execution. There is no universal 
profile that can assist in the identification of an individual who is vulnerable to 
radicalisation. These individuals are often unexceptional; rather the search for identity 
and a cause is commonplace (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).   
2.3.2 Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mind-set  
Borum (2003) proposed a four-stage model to aid investigators in analysing and 
assessing the behaviours and activities of individuals and groups associated with 
extremist ideas. The process begins by identifying a situation or condition as unjust 
(“It’s Not Right”). An economic condition such as unemployment or poor living 
conditions, or a social problem such as a restriction of freedom can be viewed as 
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unjust conditions. Thereafter the identified condition is framed as an injustice, 
meaning that it does not apply to everyone (“It’s Not Fair”). The next step involves 
blaming this injustice upon a nation, policy or person, vilifying them (It’s Your 
Fault”). The last step is making them responsible for the injustice and facilitate the 
justification of violence (“You’re Evil”). Violence can be justified when it is aimed at 
‘bad’ people, furthermore extremists label the chosen party as ‘evil’, which 
dehumanises them. Violence is justified further, because people who see themselves 
as suffering or unfairly treated, do not see their actions as ‘bad’(Borum, 2003).  
2.3.3 Wiktorowicz’s al-Muhajiroun model 
Wiktorowicz (2004) identifies four main processes that increase the likelihood of an 
individual being attracted to and eventually joining a radical Islamic group. The first 
process is ‘cognitive opening’ whereby an individual becomes open to the idea of a 
new worldview or new ideas (Wiktorowicz, 2004). This opening occurs when the 
security of an individual’s existence is threatened by personal or social events, which 
trigger the individual to search for new meaning (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). The 
second process is ‘religious seeking’ whereby an individual searching for meaning 
though religion. The third process is called ‘frame alignment’; this is where the public 
representation of the radical group makes sense to the individual and aligns with their 
beliefs. The last process is ‘socialisation’ where the individual undergoes changes in 
the value system, identity and experiences religious lessons which aid indoctrination.  
If an individual is not open to new ideas, does not encounter the movement 
message, or rejects the movement message after initial exposure, he or she 
will not participate in the kinds of movement activities necessary to fully 
disseminate the ideology and convince an individual to join (Wiktorowicz, 
2004, p.1).  
This study shows that individuals do not join extremist groups or terrorist 
organisations easily. Membership is preceded by a process of events whereby 
emotions are directed by individual experiences of the socio-political environment.  
The behaviour of radicalised individuals who later turn to terrorism, is inherently 
referential – they are not shamed, they are shamed by someone or something (Wright-
Neville & Smith, 2009).  
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2.3.4 Precht’s Conversion to Terrorism Model  
Precht’s (2007) four-stage model includes pre-radicalisation, conversion and 
identification, conviction and indoctrination and lastly, action. It is assumed that these 
are the typical steps in the radicalisation process. The four phases are separated yet 
they do overlap. There is no linear progression associated with this process, there is 
no definite time allocation to this process, and furthermore individuals may exit and 
re-enter at any phase – or stop altogether, without resolving the process with terrorist 
action.  
Phase One: Pre-radicalisation 
This phase describes the background factors which make an individual vulnerable to 
radicalisation – this includes a variety of factors such as perceived injustice, relative 
deprivation, family and friends, alienation, living conditions etcetera. Many people 
are exposed to the aforementioned background factors, however only a few become 
radicalised. Therefore, these background factors may not explain why a minority and 
not the majority of people become radicalised – they do however, provide a general 
idea of the common backgrounds where radicalisation takes place. Some individuals 
may not be of the Islamic faith at this stage (Precht, 2007). 
 
Phase Two: Conversion and Identification 
Precht (2007) acknowledges the importance of a shift in an individual’s religious 
identity at this stage. They may adopt a religious identity, adopt a radical 
interpretation of religion from a previously normal observance, or shift from one faith 
to another. This stage is greatly influenced by individuals who are frustrated with 
their lives, politics or international events. They are seeking answers and often radical 
Islam offers solutions. Individuals start to shape their identity around their newly 
found faith and show an increased social commitment (wearing traditional Muslim 
clothing where previously there was no inclination). According to Iannaccone 
(2006,p.3): 
Religious extremism typically manifests itself in distinctive dress and 
grooming, restrictive diet, voluntary poverty, ceaseless worship, communal 
living, rigorous chastity, liberal charity, and aggressive proselytizing. Such 
behaviour may strike outsiders as bizarre and irritating, or even fanatical and 
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illegal, but rarely does it involve violence, much less murder…extremist 
groups of all kinds display similar attributes, experience similar problems, and 
adopt similar strategies  
The prospect of being part of something bigger than oneself and import is a major 
contributing factor towards the radicalisation process (Precht, 2007). 
 
Phase Three: Conviction and Indoctrination 
In this phase of the process, individuals begin to distance themselves from their 
former life and immerse themselves further into radical Islam. Overseas travel and 
training camps facilitate group bonding. Individuals fully accept the ideology of 
Islamism and begin to view violence as a legitimate and necessary means to advance 
the cause of radical Islam. Identification with likeminded individuals and/or a 
charismatic religious leader can heavily influence the process of radicalisation 
(Precht, 2007). 
 
Phase Four: Action 
This last phase is where the target selection, planning and implementation takes place. 
In this phase, each individual accepts their responsibility to partake in the terrorist act. 
This part of the process is relatively short (compared to the rest of the radicalisation 
process). Group bonding is intensified by further alienation from their previous life, 
as well as training and overseas travel. Individuals become more orientated towards 
fulfilling the goals of the group, and seek moral support for their actions from the 
Internet or extremist media (Precht, 2007). 
According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) the study of mass psychology is 
needed to understand radicalisation. Individuals who are involved in terrorist violence 
depend on others sympathising and supporting their cause or grievance.  
 
All people operate on their own internal “map” of reality… If people 
understand their opponents’ “maps,” it becomes easier to understand and to 
anticipate their actions (Borum, 2003, p.8) 
According to Sik Hung Ng (2005) there is a psychological need for individuals to 
verify and enhance the value of their self-concept. They will do so, by individual or 
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collective means, even if it means committing emotional or physical harm to others. 
Though it may be simplistic, the self may be analysed as consisting of the personal 
identity and the social identity in order to analyse intergroup behaviour. The personal 
identity is formed by individual successes and failures, personality traits and 
experiences that form a unique individual. The social identity is formed by group 
membership (willingly or externally imposed). This membership carries social 
emotional meaning that defines the individual as part of a collective. When the group 
an individual identifies with is undermined, shamed or devalued, they feel personally 
hurt. Sometimes people are willing to go to war, or sacrifice themselves in order to 
elevate the status of the group (Sik Hung Ng, 2005).  
2.3.5 McCauley and Moskalenko: Individual Radicalisation 
 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) identified seven mechanisms of radicalisation at 
an individual level: personal grievance, group grievance, slippery slope, love, risk and 
status seeking, and unfreezing.  
 
Personal Grievance 
With regards to personal grievance, Individuals may commit acts of political violence 
because they believe they or those they love have been treated unfairly. It rests upon 
the premise that when a wrong is committed, there is a need for justice or revenge. 
Justice meaning the wrongdoers should be punished, whereas revenge implies the 
wronged party should be the one doing the punishing. The core emotion underpinning 
revenge and justice is anger – directed at the cause of the injustice. Anger can 
originate through the perception of insult or injustice leading to the desire for revenge. 
On the other hand people who have had to experience pain, frustration and 
discrimination may have an increased and undiscerning aggression.  
 
Group Grievance 
Group grievance involves identifying with others (a common human behaviour) and 
caring about their wellbeing. Positive identification means that one wants the others 
which one identifies with to be happy and safe, and do not want them to suffer. 
Negative identification is the inverse – one desires the other to fail or be endangered, 
rather than prosper. Individuals can identify and care for groups they are not part of, 
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individuals (celebrities) or groups (sports teams) they do not know in a personal 
capacity and companion animals (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).  According to 
Wright-Neville and Smith (2009) identity has no spatial boundaries. One does not 
need to be in close proximity to the group or individual they identify with. People can 
become politically and emotionally engaged with individuals and events that are 
taking place outside the space or environment. Furthermore, emotional attachment is 
not restricted to an individual’s nation of origin or its people. Individuals can have 
multiple loyalties, which extend beyond nations, and this varies depending on the 
issue at hand and the individual (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009).  A great deal of 
money, time and emotions are spent on ensuring the welfare of groups that one 
identifies with. Personal and group grievances are often related, in that the personal 
and political reasons for anger are soon joined (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).  
 
Slippery Slope 
The slippery slope encompasses individuals doing something they do not necessarily 
want to do. Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ is an example of such behaviour. 
Milgram’s study (1963) focused on the affect of authority on obedience. The study 
aimed to measure the willingness of an individual, instructed by an authority figure to 
commit acts that were in conflict with their conscience. The study consisted of a 
subject (volunteer), a learner (confederate) and a teacher (the experimenter/position of 
authority). Subjects were to give an electrical shock to learners for each wrong answer 
given in the test. Though some were hesitant to continue with the test due to the 
pained sounds coming from the learners – the authority figure instructed them to 
continue, and not to worry as they would not be held responsible – some did so even 
after the learners had gone quiet (Milgram, 1963). This experiment provides an 
example of cognitive dissonance whereby humans change their opinions to fit their 
behaviour; and try to justify their behaviour in order to excuse it. In this case, it 
wasn’t their fault if anything happened to the learners because the authority figure had 
told them to continue. Furthermore, the levels of electric shock were in small 
increments, with each shock forming a justification for the next. “…they nevertheless 
proceeded to commit progressively more violent acts because a person of authority 
told them to do so and because the slippery slop of closely graded violent behaviours 
made it hard to find a place to stop” (McCauley & Moskalenko, p. 155). Terrorist 
groups rely on the nature of the slippery slope in order to desensitize people to 
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violence via a slow escalation of assignments. Waller (2007) asserts that killing is 
easier when there is a distance between victim and perpetrator.  As the range between 
victim and perpetrator shortens, killing becomes more difficult. Distance should not 
be understood purely as a physical construct, it is also a psychological and moral 
construct. Therefore distance can also imply the perpetrators perceptions of the 
victim. 
 
Love, Risk and Status Seeking 
Love for friends and family can often pull individuals into the process of 
radicalisation. Furthermore individuals are often recruited via personal relationships 
and connections they have to existing members – this is because they are working 
around the idea of trust. They need to reduce the chance of members betraying them 
to the authorities. Trust is often a determining factor with regards to who will be 
recruited – but love is often the determinant of who joins. After becoming a member 
of a radical group, cohesion within the group is likely to increase due to the escalation 
of common goals and threats (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).  
Risk and status seeking is most common amongst young men and boys, as it is seen as 
a fast route to money and respect. By engaging in high-risk activities a man displays 
bravery, strength and appears self-assured.  
 
Unfreezing 
Unfreezing refers to the loss of assurance in relationships and everyday routines, for 
example a parent dying. Unfreezing is a state of personal crisis and disconnection that 
leaves the individual with less to lose, and in search of new pathways (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2011).  
 
2.3.6 Conclusion  
There are many different ideas about the path to radicalisation, the steps and number 
of stages involved, what can be agreed upon is that it is a process. Inherent in this 
process is a change in one’s beliefs, ideas and orientation in the world. Radicalisation 
should not be confused with terrorism or being a “terrorist”. Radicalisation may be 
viewed as a shift in ideology whereas terrorism is purposeful act of violence.  
 
With regards to phase models, one must acknowledge the constraints in attempts to 
	 32	
form a chronology of radicalisation because there is an unsatisfactory amount of data 
with regards to the causes. Although phase models offer valuable insight, there are 
considerable shortcomings. Phase models may have a methodological error known as 
selection on the dependent variable (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) whereby the researcher 
selects cases with a certain value attached to the dependent variable, in order to create 
a pattern that produces the same outcome. “Just as it is impossible to explain why 
books become bestsellers by examining only bestsellers, it is impossible to explain 
radicalisation only by cases of radicalisation. Phase models, however, do exactly this” 
(Veldhuis & Staun, 2009, p.17).  Phase models work backwards to describe what 
might have happened. This is why phase models cannot explain why some individuals 
radicalise and others do not. Phase models may apply statistical discrimination. 
Statistical discrimination occurs when one makes use of general traits to identify a 
particular group (in this case those who are vulnerable to, or in the process of 
radicalisation), the group in this case is small and politically sensitive. The percentage 
of people that actually reach the point of violent radicalisation is very small; however 
using phase models that attribute characteristics such as “a change in behaviour” or 
“becoming more interested in religion” can raise red flags where there are none. 
Statistical discrimination may also result in creating radical identities for people who 
would otherwise not have engaged or had an inclination towards violent radicalisation 
(Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). According to Moro (2009, p.1): 
Statistical discrimination is a theory of inequality between demographic 
groups based on stereotypes that do not arise from prejudice or racial and 
gender bias. When rational, information-seeking decision makers use 
aggregate group characteristics, such as group averages, to evaluate individual 
personal characteristics, individuals belonging to different groups may be 
treated differently even if they share identical observable characteristics in 
every other aspect. 
The use of general characteristics may unintentionally single out a particular race, or 
religion, and create a self-fulfilling prophecy for individuals who share those 
characteristics. Furthermore these individuals may appear to pose a threat, limiting an 
individual’s ability to live free of discrimination. The feeling of being victimized or 
vilified may undermine one’s loyalty to that society and its authorities and increase 
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one’s susceptibility to radicalisation rather than diminish it (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). 
 
The following chapter will discuss the theoretical frameworks for this study - the Root 
Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009), Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism (2005) 




































The following models and theory will provide a means of analysis and interpretation 
for this study. The Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) categorises the most 
cited micro and macro causes of radicalisation; Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism 
(2005) assesses the psychological processes an individual goes through on their 
journey towards terrorism; and the Rational Choice theory explains why individuals 
make the choices they do. 
 
3.2 Veldhuis and Staun - Root Cause Model 
 
The Root Cause Model analyses the most frequently cited causes of radicalisation, 
whilst categorising these causes into macro and micro (social and individual) levels. 
By distinguishing between macro and micro level factors, one may explain why some 
individuals radicalise and others do not (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). The root cause 
model provides a framework with which to analyse how causal variables at different 
levels relate to each other and how they shape the circumstances under which 
radicalisation is more – or less – likely to occur. Hence the model serves as a starting 
point from which to further investigate and counter radicalisation processes (Veldhuis 
& Staun 2009, p.21). At the centre, one examines the individual - whose attitude and 
behaviour is subject to a variety of influences over time. One the outer circle, one 
explores macro-level factors which include social and cultural structures, politics, 
education and unemployment.  
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Figure 1: Causal Factors of Radicalisation (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009, p.24)  
Macro-level factors alone cannot sufficiently explain radicalisation. One must take 
into account the micro-level defined by the individual and the way in which they are 
embedded and interact with social structures. The micro-level is represented by the 
two inside layers of the model, taking social factors into account – or the way the 
individual interacts with relevant others. These “others” do not only include in group 
members but also members of an out-group. Generally how individuals perceive and 
react to macro-level factors depends on where they live, what they believe, who their 
friends are, what kind of family they have, how they compare themselves to others, 
etcetera (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). 
The innermost layer represents the individual, accounting for psychological 
characteristics, beliefs, experiences and opinions. The factors on the outer circle 
facilitate radicalisation, with the author’s arguing that there are specific trigger events 
or precipitating factors that precede violent group activity (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). 
Individuals are influenced through their experiences and perceptions of the social 
world. Analysis at the individual level is important because through a model like this, 
one can see how micro-level factors are activated and sustained within specific social 
environments (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). Political, economic and social 
conditions change over time. Personal experiences are also dynamic – therefore it is 
about when and how factors have a radicalisation effect. Catalyst events are 
unpredictable and can occur on the micro and macro level. Catalysts vary in effect 
across individuals and accelerate the radicalisation process (but cannot initiate the 
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radicalisation process alone). The authors differentiate between recruitment and 
trigger events (“incidents that tip an individual from being a passive yet angry 
observer into an active and motivated terrorist” (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009)). The 
levels and causal factors do overlap however the classification used in their study is a 
comprehensive and useful way to integrate and organise the frequently mentioned 
contributing factors towards radicalisation (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).  
“Any useful framework must be able to integrate mechanisms at micro (individual) 
and macro (societal/cultural) levels. It must account for the fact that "one size does 
not fit all" when it comes to creating a violent extremist” (Borum, 2011).  
3.3 Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism  
 
Moghaddam (2005) applies the metaphor of a narrowing staircase to terrorism. This 
metaphor appears to be more applicable to the development of political terrorism, 
relative to the origin of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. It is an attempt to explain 
why only a few individuals in a society commit acts of terror. Naturally the staircase 
leads the individual to different floors – all of which have different doors (choices). 
Each step is influenced by a different psychological process, and is fundamentally 
about how the individual views the building and options available to them; with the 
variety of choice becoming smaller as one ascends the staircase. “As individuals 
climb the staircase, they see fewer and fewer choices, until the only possible out- 
come is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both” (Moghaddam, 2005, p.161). 
Moghaddam’s (2005) Staircase to Terrorism is a useful metaphor to explain the 
processes or stages an individual goes through on their path to terrorism. The 
individual can move up and down the staircase, but must complete process on the 
previous step in order to progress. Their discontent, leads the individual up the 
staircase, where they begin to distance themselves from out-group members and 
accept terrorism as a solution to their problems, culminating in an act of terror.   
 
The staircase is constructed as having a ground floor, and five higher floors. 
Moghaddam (2006) argues that the ground floor is the same across all cultures, as the 
source of terrorism is related to the conditions on the ground floor. Therefore, he 
asserts that if issues at the ground floor are addressed we can reduce the occurrence of 
terrorism. Similarly, the chances of an individual climbing down the staircase after 
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reaching the fourth or fifth floor, is unlikely across cultures. In this theory terrorism is 
viewed as a rational problem-solving strategy for those who go through the 
psychological processes on each step in the staircase. The terrorist act is not seen as 
an irrational emotional impulse, but rather as a rational choice given the limited range 
of alternatives on the different stages of the model.  
 
The importance of the psychological processes on each floor varies across cultures. 
The author uses the example of post-war Iraq – as a lot of the inspiration for terrorism 
is derived from displaced aggression onto the United States and its’ army. “Terrorists 
are made, they are not born. Terrorism arises from societal conditions, not individual 
characteristics” (Moghaddam, 2006, p.45).  
 
3.3.1 The First Floor 
 
On the first floor, there are the perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative 
deprivation. According to Lygre, Eid, Larsson and Ranstorp (2011) the ground floor 
of the Staircase Model (Moghaddam, 2005) relates to Relative Deprivation Theory. It 
involves how the individual psychologically interprets their material conditions, and 
an increasing dissatisfaction with the social world. If the individual interprets their 
material conditions as an injustice, the individual continues to the next step. It 
involves the individual’s motivation to improve living, to attain justice, and a pleasing 
identity. Apart from impoverishment and a lack of education, Moghaddam (2005) 
notes that perceptions of injustice can also relate to political conditions and threats to 
personal or collective identity; this is of particular importance with regards to 
religious fundamentalists due to religion’s ability to serve the needs of identity 
(Moghaddam, 2005). According to Slootman and Tillie (2006) assert that individuals 
do not need to belong to the lowest social group to feel deprived – it is about the 
perception of deprivation. Individuals can feel deprived when their current situation 
does not meet the level of effort they put in, or their expectations. These feelings form 
part of the integration paradox – the more an individual tries to integrate with the 
majority of society, the more aware they become of cultural conflict and expressions 
of exclusion (Slootman & Tillie, 2006). This phase essentially speaks to Terror 
Management Theory (TMT). Terror Management Theory (TMT) is used to look into 
the psychological forces that encourage or deter support for terrorism. Shame, 
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degradation or perceived injustice threaten the cultural views and self-esteem which 
protect people from anxiety related to death. Cultural worldviews come from one’s 
sense of reality and external culture which provides purpose, value and meaning, 
including a literal or symbolic connection to something greater than oneself – 
something that surpasses mortal existence (Pyszczynski, Rothschild & Abdollahi, 
2008).  Furthermore sharing a worldview with others increases self-esteem. Cultural 
worldviews provide individuals with a sense of order and an understanding of what is 
acceptable and expected of them (Savage & Liht, 2008). 
 
When one feels threatened, the anxiety could manifest as hostility or violence towards 
the threatening group. From the perspective of TMT human behaviour stems from the 
need to maintain faith in one’s worldview thereby reducing anxiety. Those who share 
similar beliefs increase faith or confidence in one’s worldview – conversely those 
who challenge or hold other views with disdain undermine faith and the ability to 
manage anxiety. In order to manage anxiety people derogate the out-group or try to 
convert them to their worldview. Should the threat of the out-group become 
significant, extermination is an option (Pyszczynski, Rothschild & Abdollahi, 2008). 
Defence of one’s worldview is about reducing death anxiety as well as thoughts 
associated with death (Savage & Liht, 2008). 
 
Individuals with rigid, authoritarian worldviews, who crave structure, construe 
the world in terms of absolute good and evil, and believe they hold the 
singular truth—such as religious fundamentalists—are especially prone to 
respond to threat with hostility toward those with opposing worldviews. 
Religious teachings seem an especially effective way of justifying violence, 
perhaps because of the central role that morality plays in providing self-esteem 
and death transcendence (Pyszczynski, Rothschild & Abdollahi, 2008, p.320). 
 
3.3.2 The Second Floor 
 
Those who reach the second floor, but do not find solutions feel a great deal of anger 
and frustration. Sometimes individuals on this floor, develop a readiness to physically 
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displace aggression and actively seek out opportunities to do so (Moghaddam, 2005). 
At this stage, these individuals begin to adopt a morality that condones terrorism. 
When there are no viable options available, these individuals eventually find 
themselves on the third floor seeking a solution. 
 
3.3.3 The Third Floor 
 
Those who reach the third floor now see terrorism as a logical, justifiable option, and 
sometimes they are influenced to displace their aggression onto others, an “enemy”. 
“Having started from the ground floor, where they share feelings of frustration, 
injustice, and shame with vast populations… dedicated to changing the world by any 
means available to them” (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 165). This is the floor where moral 
engagement is discussed – from the view of the terrorist, they are the one’s who are 
morally engaged; the “enemy” government and their agents are morally disengaged. 
With regards to moral disengagement, violence against members of an out-group may 
soothe temporal grievances however it is not an easy task to undertake. According to 
Bandura (2004) self-sanctions are important for the regulation of inhumane conduct. 
Through socialisation individuals develop a set of moral standards that serve as a 
guide for behaviour. Applying the aforementioned standards to oneself regulates 
behaviour. Individuals behave in a way, which gives them a sense of satisfaction, 
conversely going against one’s set of standards results in self-condemnation. 
 
A complex combination of de-individuation and dispersion of responsibility is needed 
to create a framework in which killing members of the out-group can be justified – a 
progressive emotional detachment from other people (Bandura, 1999; Wright-Neville 
& Smith, 2009).  
 
Bandura (1999) notes that the disengagement of moral self-sanctions is a growing 
concern at a group and individual level. Moral agency is viewed as the ability to resist 
inhumane behaviour, whilst proactively behaving humanely. Moral disengagement 
centres on the reconstruction of inhumane conduct into something worthy or 
defensible by means of moral justification, sanitizing language, displacement and 
diffusion of responsibility, dehumanizing the victims of violence and disregarding the 
effects of one’s actions. Disengagement cannot be viewed as indifference, it is a 
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gradual process of detachment whereby some individuals of groups eventually do not 
receive the same considerations of fairness and fall outside the boundaries of rules 
and moral values (Waller, 2007). 
 
Moral Justification 
People generally do not engage in hostile conduct until they have justified the 
morality of their actions to themselves. The behaviour then becomes socially and 
personally acceptable by portraying it as worthy or purposeful (Bandura, 1999). 
Perpetrators of mass violence can rationalize their violence by framing their actions as 
the right thing to do, if not a moral imperative. It can become an essential means of 
protecting their values, community, defending against oppressors or reverence to their 
national commitments. Sometimes the vulnerability of perpetrators comes from 
experiencing victimisation in the past, with these groups more likely to respond with 
violence towards a threat, viewing their aggression as defensive. In this way, violence 
may be viewed as benevolent because it is preventing further suffering – this is how 
violence can be normalized and exonerating for perpetrators (Waller, 2007). In this 
way acts of violence are “accomplished by cognitively redefining the morality of 
killing so that it can be done free from self-censure” (Bandura, 1999, p. 195).  
In times of conflict, one group’s terrorist activity is another group’s liberation 
movement. Each side feels morally superior, sanctifying their actions while 
condemning those of the out-group. 
 
Euphemistic Labelling/Sanitising Language 
Language has the ability to shape thought patterns, which then have an effect on 
actions. Activities can have very different appearances based on what they are called. 
Harmful behaviour is often made more acceptable through the use of euphemisms. 
For example, military attacks are called “surgical/tactical strikes” implying that this is 
a necessary curative activity. Agentless passive linguistic styles are used to frame 
shameful acts of violence as the work of unknown forces rather than that of people, 
imparting respectability to an illegitimate act (Bandura, 1999).  
 
Displacement and Diffusion of Responsibility  
It is easier for individuals to exercise moral control when they acknowledge that their 
actions may or are causing harm to others. People generally repudiate their part in a 
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situation if an authority figure steps in and takes the responsibility upon them. By 
placing the responsibility on someone else, and viewing their actions as based upon 
the instruction of an authority figure, individuals do not feel personally responsible 
for their actions and are free from self-condemning reactions (Milgram, 1963; 
Bandura, 1999). The division of labour can assist with the diffusion of responsibility. 
Many people run terrorist organisations and once the jobs are subdivided, each 
individual’s job seems harmless.  Once their job becomes a routine activity, there is a 
shift in focus from the morality of what they are doing, to the operational efficiency 
of their job. Making a decision in a group is another means of getting people to 
behave inhumanely. If everyone made a decision, no one feels personally responsible. 
Collective action is means of weakening moral control (Bandura, 1999).  
 
Disregarding the Consequences of One’s Actions 
Another means of weakening moral control operation is ignoring the effects of one’s 
behaviour. When an individual partakes in shameful behaviour they avoid 
acknowledging the harm it caused by minimizing it, or discrediting the evidence of 
the harm. Harming others is easier when their pain is not visible and when the actions 
are physically distant from their effects; which is made easier “in the era of faceless 
warfare, in which mass destruction is delivered remotely with deadly accuracy by 
computer and laser-controlled systems” (Bandura, 1999, p.199). When people can see 
the pain they have caused it can serve as a means of self-censure.  
 
Dehumanisation 
According to Bandura (1999) moral self-censure is dependent on the way perpetrators 
view their victims. In cases of mass killings for example, humanisation of victims 
may involve labelling people as inhuman- likening them to animals or using non-
human creatures such as monsters or demons. This type of behaviour is more likely 
when the target group can be easily identified as a separate category of people, for 
example, racial or religious groups that may be regarded as inferior or intimidating 
(Waller, 2007). Once dehumanised, victims are no longer viewed as people with 
hopes or fears – they are subhuman. It is easier to kill something that is not human; 
therefore dehumanisation is an essential step towards the perpetration of atrocities 
(Bandura, 1999). 
The conditions of modern life are conducive to dehumanisation – computerisation, 
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urbanisation and high geographic mobility allow individuals to relate to each other in 
an anonymous and impersonal fashion. Furthermore, social conditions, which 
encourage people to form in-groups and out-groups, produce schisms that encourage 
dehumanisation. 
 
Bandura (2004) states that the turning socialized individuals into fighters does not 
involve altering personality structures, moral standards or aggressive drives. It is 
about cognitively redefining what the morality of killing so it may be accomplished 
outside one’s self-imposed restraints.  
 
Through moral sanction of violent means, people see themselves as fighting 
ruthless oppressors who have an unquenchable appetite for conquest or as 
protecting their cherished values and way of life, preserving world peace, 
saving humanity from subjugation to an evil ideology, and honouring their 
country’s international commitments (Bandura, 2004, p.124).  
 
Recruitment into a terrorist organisation takes place on the fourth floor where an “us-
and-them” mentality is adopted.  
 
3.3.4 The Last Floor 
 
On the last floor, specific individuals are trained to ignore or push past inhibitions that 
prevent them from hurting themselves or others; thereby being able to carry out the 
act of terror. The technique of psychological distancing is used; they exaggerate the 
difference between in-group and out-group members and believe that their act of 
terror will make everyone realize the truth and revolt against those in authority. 
 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Identity Theory (IT) are interested in group 
dynamics and how individuals shape their identity. This theory focuses on the way in 
which groups of individuals construct their reality and self-conceptions. In other 
words, individuals take themselves as objects and categorise themselves socially in 
relation to other categories. In SIT this is known as self-categorisation and in IT it is 
known as identification  (Hogg, 1995; Stets & Burke 2000; Al Raffie, 2013). Social 
identities are echoes of social categories, groups and networks. Large-scale social 
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categories are religion and gender, for example. These form the pretext for smaller 
and community level groups and networks. Social categories create invisible 
boundaries, which separate members (in-group) from non-members (out-group). 
Therefore social categories are innately biased – not necessarily in a negative way, as 
it is simply a means of describing membership criteria in terms of norms and values, 
making them different to other social categories (Al Raffie, 2013). According to 
Waller (2007) the human mind is compelled to define the boundaries of their “tribe” 
(group).  Knowing who is, and is not part of out social group is important to humans – 
a means of categorizing into “us” and “them”.  
One of the main functions of SIT is to boost the self-esteem of in-group members 
because internal stereotypes and norms favour the in-group. This also serves the 
purpose of boosting the status of the in-group in relation to the out-group. Self-
categorisation is a cognitive process where individuals strengthen their social identity 
by emphasizing intragroup likeness and intergroup differences. This is a means of 
self-enhancement whereby individuals like to position themselves in a positive way 
when compared to the relevant out-group. These processes emphasise group 
boundaries and sets group standards for behaviour (Hogg, 1995; Al Raffie, 2013). 
Waller (2007) views this process as ethnocentrism, whereby individuals differentiate 
themselves from others (resulting in in-groups and out-groups) whilst boasting their 
superiority and looking upon the ‘other’ with contempt. He asserts that ethnocentrism 
is generally harmless, and from an evolutionary perspective it is advantageous in 
terms of strengthening communal identity. Complimentary to ethnocentrism is 
xenophobia – the fear of strangers or outsiders – because in order to define what 
constitutes part of the in-group; one must also define what it is not. These two 
aforementioned social instincts can promote conflict by allowing for in-group alliance 
and out-group aggression.  “We cooperate to compete. There is no “us” without a 
corresponding “them” to oppose” (Waller, 2007, p.201).  
 
Stets and Burke (2000) affirm that the consequence of self-categorisation may be an 
accentuation of the perceived likeness between members of the in-group, as well as an 
accentuation of differences between members of the in-group and the out-group. 
Furthermore accentuation may be applied to those areas, which have self-enhancing 
dimensions (Stets & Burke, 2000).  
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In IT identity involves categorizing oneself into a role, and incorporating the meaning 
and expectations associated with that role, all of which form standards, which guide 
behaviour. Hogg (1995) asserts that social identities are not only descriptive; they are 
also prescriptive and provide meaning. Individuals exist in a structured society, 
existing in relation to other contrasting social categories. Each category has more or 
less status, prestige or power. And these categories precede individuals – because 
people are born into a pre-structured society, thereafter individuals derive their 
identity from the social categories to which they belong. Over the course of a lifetime 
each individual will form a unique combination of social categories making up their 
unique self-concept (Stets & Burke, 2000).   
 
When a group is threatened, those who identify strongly with the group will fall 
further into it. This suggests that individuals who have a strong religious identity are 
likely to become more religious in a crisis. Efforts will be made to further distinguish 
him or herself from the relevant out-group, increase in-group self-esteem and raise in-
group homogeneity, thus strengthening the group (Al Raffie, 2013).  
 
According to Waller (2007) terrorist organisations provide a quasi-family 
environment. Individuals who may feel alienated, powerless or shamed by a real or 
imagined enemy find this quasi-family cathartic as it provides a link between how one 
feels and how one should act. Waller (2007) notes that though an individual may join 
a terrorist organisation to fulfil their needs, the organisation begins to shape them. In 
other words “once an individual is socialised into a context of rage, rage becomes an 
emotional requirement of the individual. Furthermore, once this rage is cognitively 
connected to violence, violence itself becomes a need” (Wright-Neville & Smith, 
2009). Lethal violence can have a brutalizing effect within a group. After the initial 
act of violence, killing becomes progressively easier. Within a group the desire to be 
liked, accepted and esteemed by fellow in-group members is strong. The fear of 
abandonment or ostracism can lead an individual to censor their behaviour in order to 
secure the integrity of the group they belong to. Furthermore this fear of ostracism can 
lead to the acceptance of violence as a legitimate tool. Refusal to participate or 
questioning the violence (in terms of strategy or morality) can undermine the 
existence of the group and lead to divisions within, or dismissal from the group 
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(Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009).  
  
Thinking in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ does not inevitably lead to hatred against all out-
groups. However once an individual identifies with a group it is easy to exaggerate 
inter-group differences and intra-group similarities, enhancing in-group cohesion 
whilst increasing hostility towards other groups (Waller, 2007).  
 
3.4 Rational Choice Theory 
Moghaddam’s Staircase Theory as whole may be viewed in terms of rational choice - 
Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) conducted research on the psychological factors in 
terrorism at an individual, group, and organisational level. They endeavoured to 
understand terrorist behaviour as a form of psychopathology and/or as the unique 
gathering of personality traits. The study yielded no results as to psychopathology or a 
unique personality construction for terrorists. Results revealed the normality of 
terrorists. Moskalenko, McCauley and Van Son (2013) further affirm that a terrorist is 
no more likely to suffer from psychopathology than any other individual from a 
similar background. They are also no more economically deprived or underprivileged. 
If most terrorists do not suffer from a major mental illness one may have to consider 
rational choice theory.  
 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) identifies a unit of analysis (in this case, an individual 
who is vulnerable to radicalisation and the subsequent commission of a terrorist act) 
and attempts to rationalize their decision (Lindauer, 2009). Terrorism is about the 
systematic inducement of terror aimed at civilians as a means of coercion, committed 
for religious, political or ideological goals (Danilović & Manojlović, 2013). As such it 
is a planned event that is carried out in a logical and systematic fashion. By 
recognizing these occurrences as logical – and by default the terrorist’s as rational 
actors – one attempts to understand what the preferences of these individuals are, and 
why they choose to commit acts of terror (Lindauer, 2009).  
According to Moskalenko and McCauley (2011) when attempting to apply rational 
choice theory there is a lack of understanding in relation to ethnic and national 
conflict and its connection to suicide bombings, for example. It must be noted that in 
opposition to the rational choice theory some individuals will sacrifice their self-
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interests for the good of others. This is in opposition to the cost-benefit analysis 
method found within RCT – individuals attempt to minimize their efforts (cost) whilst 
trying to maximize the return (benefit) (Lindauer, 2009). Soldiers in armies, for 
example, are motivated to fight for their country, by a system of rewards and 
punishments by the state. The state may bring soldiers to the battlefield, but the love 
for their comrades makes them fight. Moskalenko and McCauley (2011) explored the 
psychology behind self-sacrificing behaviours in conjunction with Olson’s (1969, as 
cited in Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011) “free-rider problem”. The basic premise is 
why should an individual sacrifice anything for the good of the public at no benefit to 
them? It may seem better to let others sacrifice and share in their efforts – “to free ride 
on their efforts rather than let them free ride on mine“ (Moskalenko & McCauley, 
2011, p. 119).  From this perspective an individual who sacrifices for the general good 
may be viewed as irrational. While it may not seem rational to sacrifice oneself for 
others, one must take into account the power of group identification, as making 
positive and negative identifications with others is natural (Moskalenko & McCauley, 
2011). There can be a dark side to caring and being empathic towards others. It is 
possible for individuals can kill for love, even for the love of strangers seen as 
victimized. Perhaps the idea of being a ‘hero’ is attractive to some. Perhaps it is the 
realisation of the finality of life which brings up the desire to go out having done 
something honourable – or to be remembered. In any event, the idea of self-sacrifice 
trumping self-interest requires further investigation. In addition, Staun (2008) notes 
that although rational choice may give some insight into the strategic benefits of 
terrorism, the theory cannot fully explain the phenomenon of radicalisation.  
This theory advocates that terrorist actions are a conscious and rational decision – a 
rationally chosen strategy to accomplish a specific goal (Victoroff, 2005) even though 
it may appear to be irrational (Scott, 2000). Individuals all have specific goals or 
preferences and make choices within given constraints on how to obtain the most 
desirable outcome. Rational choice theory asserts that individuals will consider the 
outcomes of various courses of action and decide which is most beneficial (Scott, 
2000). With regards to this study, one would have to look into instrumental 
rationality. This type of rationality holds no judgement about preferences, meaning 
that it does not matter if a choice seems “evil” or “irrational” – in this light Adolf 
Hitler would be just as rational as Nelson Mandela. Acknowledging rationality in this 
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fashion simply means that individuals make a choice based on their preference, 
whatever it may be (Quakenbush, 2004).  
 
Crenshaw (1981) notes that many events of terror were purposeful activities based 
upon a rational political choice. Individuals and organisations have particular values, 
beliefs and perspectives with regards to their environment. Taking this into 
consideration, an act of terror may be seen as a logical method to make an 
environment or predicament more favourable. This does not mean however, that 
every extremist group or radicalised individual has a clear objective. Terrorism is a 
tool that allows for intimidation and destabilisation, which may only be viewed as a 
logical choice if the group enacting terror has a similar power ratio to the government 
or society it is challenging (Crenshaw, 1981). There are some individuals who believe 
that terrorism will advance their cause (Victoroff, 2005; Lakhani, 2013). A minority 
that believes there are no other means for change usually adopts this strategy; 
terrorism becomes attractive because it is simple with a high potential for reward 
(Crenshaw, 1981). According to Schmid (2013) terrorism is prevalent today because 
modern circumstances make terrorists methods and acts exceptionally easy to 
undertake. Terrorism may be viewed as the outcome of a learning process that 
incorporates personal and social experiences. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In summation, radicalisation may be viewed as shift in one’s thinking and behaviour 
in accordance with an ideology that need not advocate violence. The two 
aforementioned theories look into who is susceptible to radicalisation, whether they 
are in the process or have already become radicalised. These individuals are relatively 
socially, politically and/or economically deprived as compared to those around them. 
Whether this disadvantage is perceived or not, this leads to frustration, and this anger 
has the potential to be turned into terrorism (Lakhani, 2013). The Staircase model 
(Moghaddam, 2005) unlike other phase or stage models does not discriminate against 
or stigmatise minorities. The Root Cause Model (RCM) (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) 
looks at the commonly cited causes of radicalisation – the (socio) psychological and 
sociological circumstances under which radicalisation is more likely to occur, while 
the Staircase Model (Moghaddam, 2005) looks at the course of action or 
radicalisation in response to the circumstances found in the aforementioned model. 
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Lastly with regards to the rational choice theory, the course of action an individual 
chooses and their rationale cannot be viewed as irrational as it is based upon their 






































This research paper will be approached from a constructionist orientation, whilst 
utilizing academic literature to compare and contrast the views of different authors as 
well criticise and highlight specific studies and cases, in order to build a 
comprehensive account of radicalisation. Four case studies will be used to illustrate 
how radicalisation could possibly occur and the elements or factors that may 
influence the process. Content analysis will be used, whilst the theoretical framework 
serves as a blue print for relating the various themes or elements that contribute to 
radicalisation. 
 
4.2 Research questions 
 
1. What is radicalisation? 
 1.1 What are the psychological processes involved in radicalisation? 
 1.2. What makes an individual vulnerable to radicalisation? 
 
2. What are the causal (micro and macro) factors – from the individual, to the social 
and to the structural that could contribute to radicalisation among Muslims in South 
Africa?  
2.1 How do causal factors relate to each other and how do they contribute to 
radicalisation when combined?  
 
4.3 Research Methods  
 
A. Research design 
 
The research will be approached from a constructionist orientation, which assumes 
that people create and shape what reality is for them. Constructivism is a 
methodology that allows researchers to investigate the beliefs of individuals rather 
than an external reality. Perception is not reality – because reality is a blend of 
perceptions and external reality (Christie, Rowe, Perry & Chamard, 2000). 
Constructivism allows for the complexities of the human experience - the idea of each 
facet of an individuals life intertwining. Human beings are intricately involved 
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together in the construction of their worlds. There is an absence of an absolute truth 
and an importance placed upon context (Roller & Lavrakas, 2015). In this regard, the 
researcher is interested in the value within the answers (Christie, Rowe, Perry & 
Chamard, 2000). The constructionist orientation allows the researcher to look at how 
individuals define their behaviour and their circumstances. Furthermore this approach 
emphasises human agency and voluntarism, meaning people have the ability to make 
choices within their social and subjective context. “People have their own reasons for 
their actions, and we need to learn the reasons that people use. Individual motives are 
crucial to consider even if they are irrational, carry deep emotions, and contain 
mistaken beliefs and prejudices” (Neuman, 2011, p. 104).  
 
B. Data collection techniques 
 
This study will be making use of four case studies in order to demonstrate the 
psychology involved in radicalisation. When conducting a case study:  
 
[the] researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or 
more individuals. The case(s) are [bound] by time and activity, and researchers collect 
detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained 
period of time (Cresswell, 2003).  
 
The	 researcher will make use of narrative inquiry to research and collect data about 
Mohammed Sidique Khan, Imam Anjem Choudary, Mustafa Mohamed as well as 
Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie, including relevant documentation derived from 
secondary sources. A purposive sampling approach was used to select the data for the 
case studies. The documentation will consist of mass media records and non-personal 
documents. The advantage of using a document study method is that it allows for easy 
access to inaccessible subjects; it is low cost and easy to replicate (Stocks, 1999).  
 
D. Data analysis 
 
Content analysis will be used in this study. The Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & 
Staun, 2009) will be applied to South Africa and the United Kingdom to show the 
causes of radicalisation or points of vulnerability for each country. This application 
will then tie in with the case studies, where Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism 
(2005) model will be applied. The purpose of this is to show the possible causes for 
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E. Validity, Reliability and Rigour  
 
It is difficult to assess the validity or rigour of a qualitative study; therefore one must 
look at towards a set of criteria under the acronym TAPUPAS to assess the merit of 
the research. TAPUPAS stands for: transparency (are the reasons for the research 
clear?), accuracy (is it based on relevant evidence), purposivity (is the method used 
suitable for the aims?), utility (does it provide answers to the questions it sets?), 
propriety (is it legal and ethical?), accessibility (is it easy to understand?) and 
specificity (does it meet the standard as set by the knowledge in its field?) (Porter, 
2007). The reasons for research in this area are clear, there are very few studies 
related to radicalisation in South Africa – despite the evidence of training camps and 
individuals fleeing to join ISIS, for example. The methods being used for this study 
are the most effective at this stage, and it is hoped that they will provide answers to 
the questions posed. The study will be legal, ethical and easy to understand. The 
researcher aims for the study to meet the standard of knowledge as set by its field. It 
is important to mention that there are some limitations associated with this 
methodology. The information may depend partly on biographical accounts, which 
may undermine the research analysis. Furthermore, document studies can suffer from 
a sampling and journalistic bias (Stocks, 1999). Because the Staircase Model 
(Moghaddam, 2005) is supported by empirical evidence – the questions that will be 
used are based on the steps in the model.  
 
F. Anticipated Problems 
 
The researcher was unfortunately unable to interview current members of violent 
radical groups, and will be making use of material that would provide insight into the 
current dynamics and developments around radicalisation in South Africa.  
The researcher acknowledges the sensitive nature of the study and the potential it has 
to offend others. The utmost care will be taken to present information about religion 
and its followers in a neutral fashion. This study is not about the religion of Islam – It 
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This research paper will be a document study approached from a constructionist 
orientation. Moghaddam’s (2005) Staircase to Terrorism Model and The Root Cause 
Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) will be applied to the case study of Mohammed 
Sidique Khan, Imam Anjem Choudary, Mustafa Mohamed as well as Brandon-Lee 
and Tony-Lee Thulsie. Purposive sampling was used to gather information for this 































5.1 Introduction  
 
The following section will consist of the British case studies of Mohammed Sidique 
Khan and Imam Anjem Choudary, followed by the South African case studies of 
Mustafa Mohamed and Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie. 
 
5.2 British Case Studies 
5.2.1 MOHAMMED SIDIQUE KHAN 
Mohammed Sidique Khan (MSK) was the eldest of the four suicide bombers 
responsible for the 7/7 bombings in London. He was born in 1974, the son of 
Pakistani immigrants Tika Khan and Mamida Begum (Laville & Aslam, 2005). He 
was raised in relatively poor circumstances, and lived in low-income immigrant 
neighbourhood in Beeston, Leeds. MSK’s first school was mainly white, but he did 
not have trouble integrating. He was purportedly quiet and scholarly, and sometimes 
vulnerable due to the occasional bullying at school. In his youth, MSK considered 
himself Western and encouraged his non-Muslim friends to call him “Sid” (BBC 
News, 2007; Staun, 2008). He was also known for wearing a leather jacket and 
cowboy boots whilst praising American life after a short visit to the United States at 
the age of 15 (Kirby, 2007). Furthermore in his teens, he did not show an inclination 
towards religion and rarely went to mosque (BBC News, 2007; Staun, 2008). It was in 
his teens where he began to show an interest in religion and supposedly became a 
Wahhabi (Malik, 2007). 
While studying business at Leeds Metropolitan University he met his future wife 
Hasina and become involved in assisting disadvantaged youth. According to a friend, 
MSK’s family ostracized him because Hasina was an Indian woman. This situation 
was not acceptable to them and they wanted nothing to do with him (Kirby 2007). 
After University, he become a school youth worker, and began to show a clear and 
distinct interest in his faith as a Muslim. He turned to religion after his blemished 
youth where he was involved in fights, drugs and drinking. His colleagues at the time 
reported no suggestion of extremism in the way he spoke about his faith (BBC News, 
2007; Staun, 2008). In retrospect, some now recall a change in MSK’s character. It 
was said that he had become more introverted and at times, had displayed an 
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intolerant attitude that contrasted with his generally easy-going manner.  MSK’s time 
was invested in the mosques and Islamic groups of Leeds, Huddersfield and 
Dewsbury, comprising of voluntary work and youth activities planning. It was said 
that MSK became a figure that the children looked up to. One may speculate that he 
used this opportunity to identify and recruit individuals for the radical version of 
Islam that he was now advocating. MSK, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain (two 
of the other 7/7 bombers) reportedly spent a great deal of time together in the months 
preceding the attack (BBC News, 2007).  
MSK was dismissed from his career in education in 2004 due to poor attendance, 
which concluded in a period of sick leave from 20 September to 19 November. He 
then went to Pakistan with the aforementioned Tanweer. It is thought that the pair 
made contact with members of the Al-Qaeda network. After the 7/7 bombing it was 
revealed that MSK was also involved in another terror operation, which included the 
building of a fertilizer bomb. In the trial of the men accused of building the fertilizer 
bomb, it was revealed that MSK had been to the same terror training camp as 
members of that operation and maintained those connections upon his return (BBC 
News, 2007). 
MSK’s commitment to the 7/7 bombings seems to have stemmed from a resentment 
of Western powers in conflict with the Muslim world, and the Muslim casualties as a 
result of these conflicts. Two months after the deaths of the four bombers a video 
emerged and aired on Al Jazeera that shows MSK making a statement in which he 
explains his motives. 
Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood…I and thousands 
like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation 
doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer…Your 
democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against 
my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly 
responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my 
Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. 
And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my 
people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you 
too will taste the reality of this situation (Mohammed Sidique Khan, 2005 as 
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cited in BBC News, 2005a).  
5.2.2 IMAM ANJEM CHOUDARY 
Anjem Choudary (AC) is a British social and political activist, as well as a known 
radical Islamist preacher. AC studied commercial law at Southampton University. In 
his student days he was known as “Andy”. He was known to be a social drinker, was 
popular with women and though he dismisses accounts of his drug use, there are some 
who claim he experimented with Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) (The Guardian, 
2006) with an old friend recalling “I used to get stoned with Andy. He was a really 
lovely bloke, funny and warm”.  
The ex-friend recalls that AC did not openly show an interest in religion, however 
Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses riled him (Anthony, 2014). Although the 
publication of The Satanic Verses was one of the political events which served as a 
springboard for Islamist activism and recruitment (the others being the Iraq War, the 
genocide of Muslims in Bosnia, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) (Whine, 2009), 
AC’s ex-friend suggests it was his inability to get a job in a legal firm after graduating 
that lead him down the path of radicalisation and towards the virtues of Salafism 
(Anthony, 2014).    
A chance meeting with Sheik Omar Bakri Mohammed (at that time the leader of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, a radical pan-Islamic organisation which aims for the establishment of an 
Islamic State) was the beginning of AC’s study of Sharia law and his current 
understanding of Islam (The Guardian, 2006; Anthony, 2014).  
AC was a founding member of Salafi-Jihadist organisation Al-Muhajiroun (Arabic for 
“The Emigrants”) infamous for celebrating 9/11, which was banned in 2010 (Nawaz, 
2012; Kern, 2015). The organisation has reinvented itself under the names of Call to 
Submission, Islamic Path, Islamic Dawa Association, Need4Khalifah, Muslim 
Against Crusades and the London School of Sharia (Kern, 2015). AC formed two 
other organisations, Ghurabaa and Islam4UK that have both been proscribed – 
meaning that membership to these organisations is a criminal offence, whereby that 
organisation may not operate lawfully within the UK. AC uses social media such as 
Whatsapp and Twitter (where he has approximately 30 000 followers) to criticize 
Western governments and promote the ideals of radical Islam. He also makes use of 
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video chats and uploads audio lectures online (Aridi, 2015). AC has managed to avoid 
imprisonment by walking the fine line between the right to free speech and 
provocative Islamist dialogues (Kern, 2015). On the 5th of August 2015 AC was 
charged under the Terrorism Act 2000 for enticing support for ISIS through his 
lectures (Aridi, 2015). AC is not afraid of going to prison as he views prison as the 
perfect place to gain more followers. "If they arrest me and put me in prison..." he 
said, "I will radicalize everyone in prison" (Kern, 2015). 
AC claims to be well liked within the British Muslim community. He sees and 
represents himself as a campaigner for Sharia Law – which he believes will be 
implemented in Britain by 2050- he also opposes laws that aim to clamp down on 
radical mosques and incarcerate those who return from Iraq and Syria. AC sincerely 
believes that Sharia is the solution to every problem faced by the Western world. 
When asked whether he believes stoning a woman to death for adultery seems like an 
suitable punishment, he says, “For people who have had adultery committed against 
them, people who have had their wives taken, a lot will say 'I think stoning to death is 
appropriate'. I was like you; I was completely oblivious to Islam and the Islamic 
civilisation because I was educated in this system. But when you look at the rationale 
and benefits of it, you realise that it is, in fact, superior”. AC stresses that Westerners 
misunderstand Sharia Law, he insists that it is a system of social and economic justice 
(Anthony, 2014). 
He has been asked if he has plans to go to Syria – a question asked because he 
actively dismisses democratic Britain – he responds by saying that he would be 
arrested and his passport confiscated if he were to even contemplate travelling to 
Turkey or Syria. Despite the difficulties posed by traveling he asserts his attraction to 
ISIS –  
From what I understand from people living there, they have security, schools 
are now being set up where their children are taught about Islam, and they 
have the basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. They don't see in the public 
arena things like alcohol, drugs, gambling, these kinds of vices. They've been 
completely wiped out. I think in many respects it's the kind of society I'd love 
to live in with my family. Many people I know think the same. That doesn't 
mean that we're going to train and come back and carry out operations here 
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(Anthony, 2014). 
In a more recent interview, after having his passport confiscated, AC has said in 
relation to Islamic State “I would love to go and live there, if the British government 
would give back my passport. People are flocking to the Islamic State, [...] people are 
loving it there. You can see the parties in the streets in Raqqa and Ramadi” 
(Crowcroft, 2015). AC sees his British passport being similar to a travel card with no 
legal or social significance (Anthony, 2014) stating "We are Muslims first and 
Muslim last. Passports are no more than travel documents. If you are born in a barn 
that doesn't make you a horse!!" (Kern, 2015).  
AC, his wife and four children live comfortably in Britain with a lifestyle supported 
by British taxpayers – reportedly more than £25000 a year in welfare benefits. In 
2013 AC encouraged his followers to quit their jobs and claim unemployment 
benefits. He believes that Muslims are entitled to welfare payments because they are a 
type of jizya (a tax imposed on non-Muslims in Islamic State) – a reminder that non-
Muslims are subordinate and submissive to Muslims. He states, “We [Muslims] take 
the jizya, which is ours anyway. The normal situation is to take money from the 
kuffar [non-Muslim]. They give us the money. You work, give us the money, Allahu 
Akhbar. We take the money” (Kern, 2015).   
Similarly to MSK, AC has a strong focus on religion and his identity as a Muslim. He 
believes that following the religion of Islam would be following one’s “natural 
disposition”. AC does not identify as British -  
What is Britishness? Eating fish and chips? Standing in a queue? Singing 
‘God Save the Queen’? If that is Britishness then no, I’m not British. I have no 
affiliation to the -monarchy or the laws of this land. If you’re born in a barn it 
doesn’t make you a horse. A British passport is just a common document. It’s 
like a bus ticket to me (The Clarion Project, 2014).  
Unlike MSK one cannot find evidence for possible feelings of relative deprivation. 
AC lives comfortably in a first world, democratic country on welfare benefits. As 
stated earlier he seemed to gravitate towards religion after he failed to acquire a job he 
desired. AC seems to be dissatisfied with British society as it runs contrary to Sharia 
Law, which he believes is a necessary and vital component of Islam. – “As a Muslim 
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you cannot live side by side with other beliefs; you continue to strive for sharia” 
(Anthony, 2014). AC asserts, “under the Shari'ah, the false Gods that people worship 
instead of Allah will be removed, like democracy, freedom, liberalism, secularism 
etc” (Kern, 2015) and that “If we have enough authority and power, we are obliged as 
Muslims to take the power away from the people who have it, and implement sharia 
law" (Moon, 2013). 
5.3 South African Case Studies 
5.3.1 MUSTAFA MOHAMED (also known as MUSTAFA JONKER) 
Mustafa Jonker (MJ), his brother-in-law Omar Hartley and Sedich Achmat were 
under suspicion of attempting to start a terror campaign in South Africa by means of 
detonating bombs at specific targets (Solomon, 2013). The other men involved were 
Mohamed Davids, Abdul Rasheed Davids and Rafiek Osman. In 2008 the police 
raided two houses in Muizenberg. The charges being faced were serious – treason, 
terrorism, unlawful possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, and 
conspiracy to commit murder. None of the aforementioned were arrested. 
Furthermore, the Davids brothers left South Africa shortly after. The police 
confiscated chemicals (hydrochloric acid, acetone and peroxide) that could be used to 
make bombs, instructions on how to produce explosives and literature from various 
Jihadi websites and videos of violent beheadings.  The case was dropped after the 
state negated to provide the source and reasoning which prompted the raid (Solomon, 
2013; Piper, 2015). During an interview conducted by Khadija Abdul Qaheer, MF 
states: 
I, like thousands of Muslims like me am concerned at the plight of the 
oppressed in general and the Muslim Ummah in particular, which over the last 
century has witnessed an unprecedented onslaught from global disbelief. I 
realized from an early age that America is the main source of this global 
tyranny by her directly invading Muslim lands and killing their people and 
also by supporting apostate governments that subdue their people on her 
behalf. We returned to South Africa in 1999 [from Saudi Arabia] and I soon 
realized that while the racist apartheid regime had been removed, this new 
‘democracy’ had come about by the ANC [African National Congress] selling 
South Africa to multi-national corporations. The ANC has a history of concern 
	 59	
for only the middle and upper class blacks. The result of this treachery is a 
symbolic multicultural government which is dictated to by and passes laws on 
behalf of mainly European and American companies, the same Crusader 
nations pillaging Afghanistan and Iraq today. Today South Africa has the 
biggest gap between rich and poor in the world; a direct result of the 
government’s neoliberal capitalist policies. A wealthy elite own South 
Africa’s wealth, while 30 million people suffer from poverty. Resulting from 
this poverty is crime of which South Africa has the highest statistics in the 
world as well. I began advocating as Allah commanded direct action against 
the Crusader-Zionist alliance and her pawns in power and this is the 
background behind my being labelled a terrorist. As far as this word goes, it is 
a label placed on anyone challenging the greedy bloodthirsty agenda of the 
West and I therefore take a pride in it. Ours is a blessed terror that desires to 
see an end to America’s oppression ... it is a fact that the Jews around the 
world using the Crusaders are the main benefactors of the global campaign 
against Islam .... Jews like the Oppenheimers have a monopoly over South 
Africa’s resources and their banks ensure that the ‘goyim’ as they call the 
suffering masses are kept in a state of debt slavery. They use Usury, which 
Allah forbade them from practicing, to turn free people into slaves. Africa in 
particular is suffering from great debts owed to these prophet murderers and it 
is therefore not surprising that the bulk of attacks on Jews outside the Holy 
Land have been in Africa. Over the last few years, Mujahideen have attacked 
the Jews in Mombasa in East Africa, they attacked them in Tunisia and Egypt 
in North Africa and they attacked the Israeli embassy in Mauritania in West 
Africa and we don’t consider the Muslims here in South Africa to be any less 
determined to punish the Jews for spreading corruption over Allah’s earth. 
The Muslims in South Africa hold a special place in their hearts for their 
suffering brethren in Palestine and perhaps amongst them are those who 
pledged to fight until the Bastard State of Israel is eradicated and have pledged 
to pray in Masjid al-Aqsa as conquerors or to meet Allah on the way .... We 
are witnessing the prediction of Sheikh Osama bin Laden come true when he 
said, ‘America by picking a war with the sons of the Arabian peninsula will 
experience things that will make them forget all about the horrors of Vietnam 
and that America will turn into a shadow of her former self’. 
	 60	
5.3.2 BRANDON-LEE AND TONY-LEE THULSIE 
Identical twins Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie (BLT and TLT, respectively) 
have been charged 2004 Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist 
and Other Related Activities Act. According to their provisional charge sheet, the 
twins "conspired to commit the crime of terrorism by planning to cause explosions at 
a Mission of the United States of America and Jewish institutions” and "conspired to 
leave South Africa to join IS in Syria for the purpose of participating in acts of 
terrorism being committed by IS" as well “incite persons” to assist them. Their 
family, neighbours and friends were shocked by the news of their arrest (Hoskens & 
Smillie, 2016). The twins allegedly planned to set off explosions at a US embassy and 
several Jewish Institutions in South Africa (Shange, 2016). It was revealed that TLT 
was in regular contact with IS under the pseudonym Simba. According to Detective 
Warrant Officer Wynand Olivier:  
Simba discussed sending money to facilitate the commission of a terrorist 
attack to be executed outside the borders of South Africa. Thereafter Simba 
changed his intention and began discussing a timeline for himself to carry out 
an attack inside South Africa. Simba requested instructions on how to create a 
device. He indicated that he had people in mind for the attack and that he 
intended to blow himself up in that attack and that he was seeking funds to 
finance the attack. Simba indicated that he found an easier formula to 
manufacture explosives and that he referenced a cell phone detonator to set off 
an explosive device. He also made enquiries on how to create a car bomb. On 
June 16 Simba enquired about a list of supplies and materials he would need 
to construct an explosive device and he further indicated that he intended to 
conduct a small arms attack (Henderson, 2016a).  
From the above information given by a source (that shall not be named at this stage 
due to the sensitivity of the investigation), Simba’s activity and the danger posed by 
IS, Detective Olivier believed there was a chance that a terrorist attack could occur. 
This led to acquisition of a warrant and the subsequent search of the brother’s house 
in Newclare, Johannesburg on the 9th of July 2016. After their arrest, evidence 
confirmed the identity of Simba as TLT. According to Detective Olivier, upon 
questioning TLT said, "he believed in what he had done and was prepared to go to 
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jail" (Henderson, 2016a).  Photographs lifted from the brothers’ digital devices shows 
them posing with a bomb belt, detonator and a rifle. There were also photographs of 
an IS soldier, mutilations, public executions, and recruits being trained. A press 
release claiming the attack on Bangladesh was also found, instructions on how to 
destroy a building, as well as a guide on how to access IS’s websites and publications 
were all in their possession (Henderson, 2016b). It was later found that the rifle in the 
photograph with the twins was a paintball gun (Pretorious, 2016).  
Deidre Sissoon, who went to school with the twins, said “They were perfectly normal 
at school, outgoing and social. They had girlfriends, played sport. Brandon tried to get 
into film casting”. However, she does recall a change in them since last year, when 
they converted to Islam (Hoskens & Smillie, 2016) changing their names to Ibn 
Hernani and Yaqeen, respectively (Hoskens, 2016). “We then heard that they tried to 
go to Syria but were stopped. When they got back the mosque banned them from 
attending because its elders didn't want trouble” (Hoskens & Smillie, 2016). 
An Islamic scholar from Newclare, Muzaffar Begg noted that the twins had initially 
followed a mainstream and moderate understanding of Islam “But from the way the 
twins began to speak months later you could see something had changed. They 
became conservative, insulting our imams whom they accused of not fulfilling their 
duties. They spoke about how a good Muslim had to speak up about the abuse of ‘our 
people‘ [in Palestine and Syria]” (Hoskens, 2016). In conjunction with this, a relative 
of the family said, “When they converted, they changed a lot. They stopped partying, 
clubbing and deejaying. They left their friends and became very religious and started 
getting rid of all their worldly things. They wouldn't talk any more and became quite 
secretive" (Hoskens & Smillie, 2016). Begg had asked the twins where they had 
learnt the ideology they adopted, to which they answered “Sheikh Musa Jibril” (an 
Arab-American Islamist preacher) and “the internet” – “we [later] learnt they attended 
class at a Mayfair school, which deviated from the mainstream teachings. They 
followed the conservative Salafi teachings”. Begg says the twins told him that they 
chose that school as they were looking for a “greater” purpose – they “wanted to be 
soldiers for their religion” (Hoskens, 2016).  
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5.4 Case Study Discussion  
There are various similarities and differences amongst the aforementioned cases, 




Firstly, MSK and the twins both came from relatively low income backgrounds or, 
like MJ felt a sense of relative deprivation. AC differs, as he was well educated and 
provided for in his youth, and is living very comfortably as an adult. 
  
Secondly, MSK, the twins and AC all demonstrated a distinct change in, or a move 
towards their faith – Islam. All four of them had previously indulged in what would 
be considered un-Islamic – partying in the case of the twins, and with regards to AC 
and MSK, partaking in casual drug use and alcohol consumption.  
 
Thirdly, one finds feelings of resentment towards Western powers or the perceived 
inadequacy of one’s government, which was found in all the cases. AC and MJ in 
particular find fault or feel wronged by their own government, British and South 
African respectively, and are very vocal about their beliefs. 
  
Fourthly, MSK, AC and the twins shared the factor of youth. These individuals were 
relatively young when their changes became noticeable to family and friends. 
 
Lastly, is the use of the Internet and Jihadi literature / websites. The twins found 
Sheik Ahmed Musa Jibril online and learnt his interpretation of Islam and adopted his 
attitudes. In a similar manner MJ used the Internet to learn how to produce 
explosives, and was also in possession of violent Islamist videos.  
When I visited these Jihadi sites, I downloaded everything. This information 
that I downloaded, is information that everyone has access to and is freely 
available. They are legal to download. The pictures downloaded reveal how 
Muslims throughout the world are being killed and how they are killing those 
who are attacking them (Solomon, 2013). 
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5.4.2 Dissimilarities  
AC, unlike MJ and the twins uses the Internet and social media as a tool of 
provocation and means of gathering followers.  
MSK was the only one of the five individuals mentioned who chose the path of 
suicide terrorism.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In summation, all cases showed evidence of issues with identity, relative deprivation, 
resentment of Western powers, the use of the Internet (indicative of globalisation) and 
the complexities of social/group dynamics. Interestingly, the factors, which all the 
cases have in common, are not something that the respective governments can control 
per say – the issues leading to radicalisation are found mainly on a social and 
individual level, making the experience, perception, interpretation and resolution of 
problems subjective.  
  
The following chapter will demonstrate the application of the Root Cause Model 
(Veldhuis & Staun, 2009), Staircase to Terrorism model (Moghaddam, 2005) and the 






















Application of Theories 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The Staircase to Terrorism model (Moghaddam, 2005) will be applied to the British 
and South African case studies, respectively. After each application, a table will show 
which factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) are applicable to 
the respective cases, following with an explanation of those factors.  
Factors that apply to both British and South African cases will be explained 
cumulatively after all four applications.  
 
6.2 British Case Studies 
6.2.1 MOHAMMED SIDIQUE KHAN 
Although the Staircase to Terrorism (2005) is primarily about a group terrorist 
situation, it can be used to describe MSK’s situation. According to Malik (2007) MSK 
was raised in a community that struggled with drugs, racial issues and education 
aspiration difficulties. It is possible to assume that under these circumstances he 
would feel a sense of injustice.  
Moghaddam (2005) emphasized the importance of religion and identity (as mentioned 
previously).  
Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following 
the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad... This is how our 
ethical stances are dictated… I am directly responsible for protecting and 
avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters (Mohammad Sidique Khan, 2005; 
BBC News, 2005a) 
Muslims, who feel alienated by or resent Western policies, may find the Islamic 
framework to be a means of rejecting those societies. The frustration and resentment 
can lead individuals into a literal and radical interpretation of Islam that serves as a 
legitimisation for radical behaviour. It is possible that in his attempts to better his 
community and uplift the Muslim youth around him, MSK became frustrated – he 
was upset with foreign policy and noticed further injustices closer to home.  
Jihad is an obligation on every single one of us, men and women, and by 
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staying at home you are turning your backs on jihad which is a major sin. Our 
so-called scholars today are content with their Toyotas and their semi-
detached houses… If they fear the British Government more than they fear 
Allah then they must desist in giving talks, lectures and passing fatwas and 
they need to stay at home – they’re useless – and leave the job to the real men, 
the true inheritors of the prophet (BBC News, 2005b).  
From the above quote, it is clear that MSK considered himself best suited to deal with 
the injustices faced by Muslims in the UK. He ridicules the religious leaders, 
essentially saying they are cowards who are happy with mediocrity, and are sinners 
for turning their backs on Jihad.  By the use of “real men” and “true inheritors of the 
prophet” one may assume that he was proud of himself and considered his stance to 
be noble. Furthermore, when there are many people feeling oppressed and relatively 
deprived, some individuals will climb to the second floor to seek a solution; as stated 
earlier Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) support this observation.  
On the second floor, the individual seeks a solution. On this stage in the process, 
individuals perceive themselves as unable to influence decision-making processes in 
society. One could assume not having any power or influence in matters he 
considered to affect his life and identity, lead to frustration. Rational Choice Theory 
on the second step therefore explains terrorism as a result of a conscious, rational and 
deliberate decision to use terrorism to achieve certain socio-political goals (Lygre et 
al., 2011). The decision MSK made may not seem very rational – he is not around to 
benefit from his action, as only in death is he given recognition. What is “rational” in 
this case is what MSK chose given his subjective opinion and worldview. Putting 
aside the free-rider problem, one must take into consideration feelings of 
responsibility (to his people and what he interpreted as his religions ethical duties), 
emotions and martyrdom.  
Step three in the Staircase Model is about the displacement of aggression. The 
displacement of aggression is about individuals directing anger and frustration 
towards an external enemy, who they perceive as responsible for their situation (they 
may not be, however) (Lygre et al., 2011). MSK was openly angered by the 
interference and influence of Western powers in the Muslim world. MSK considered 
himself to be holy warrior, someone who was defending the Muslim identity. He 
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viewed Europe as opponents and believed he was saving Islamic culture from the 
West (Pantucci, 2011). 
On the fourth floor, one finds recruitment into the terror organisation. According to 
Staun (2008) MSK spent a lot of time with other young Muslim men discussing 
religion and politics at his workplace, the Hamara Youth Access Point (HYAP). He 
also frequented the local Islamic bookshop and the “Al-Qaeda gym” (p.44), a boxing 
gym in Beeston that drew radicals. Furthermore, MSK and Tanweer reportedly spent 
a lot of time at Finsbury Park Mosque. Essentially social networks played a 
significant role in MSK’s path of radicalisation. These social circles may have played 
a part in shifting his attitude towards Islamic radicalism. It is alleged that on his trips 
to Pakistan and Afghanistan, MSK attended a military training camp. It is alleged that 
the video statement released in 2005 was recorded on one of these trips (Staun, 2008). 
On the last floor, individuals become psychologically prepared and motivated to 
commit acts of terrorism, sometimes resulting in multiple civilian deaths. 
Psychological distancing is achieved partly through the adoption of terrorist myths, 
for example, by attacking civilian targets, social order will be disrupted and this can 
be used as a way to make people see the truth and rebel against authorities 
(Moghaddam, 2005). One cannot be certain as to how these trips to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan affected MSK however they may have functioned as catalysts, hastening 
and strengthening the process of radicalisation. It is a possibility that he encountered 
acquaintances that inspired him to carry out his attack in Britain. There was a short 
period of time between his trip to Pakistan and the 7/7 attacks – perhaps these trips 
solidified MSK’s commitment to Jihad, and provided him with experience and 







Table 1: Table showing factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) 
and the Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to MSK. 
Mohammed Sidique Khan FACTOR FOUND 
WITHIN THE RCM 
PROGRESS ON THE 
STAIRCASE 
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6.2.2 IMAM ANJEM CHOUDARY 
AC’s father was a Pakistani stallholder at the Deptford market in south-east London 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s. He would walk his father to work every day, however the 
one day that he was too busy to do so, his mother did – that day his father died at the 
market (Crowcroft, 2015). As mentioned previously McCauley and Moskalenko 
(2011) made note, unfreezing which refers to the loss of assurance in relationships 
and everyday routines. This state of personal crisis and disconnection may leave an 
individual feeling they have less to lose, therefore they go in search of new pathways. 
Perhaps AC found comfort in embracing his faith.  
 
On the second step one looks at the RCT that sees terrorism as a conscious and 
rational decision to achieve one’s goals. Although AC has not committed an act of 
terror – he has encouraged others and always provides a rationale for terror attacks. 
With regards to the attack of Charlie Hebdo, AC released an open letter that was 
published in USA Today. An extract from the letter read, “although Muslims may not 
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agree about the idea of freedom of expression, even non-Muslims who espouse it say 
it comes with responsibilities. In an increasingly unstable and insecure world, the 
potential consequences of insulting the Messenger Muhammad are known to Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike…Why did France allow the tabloid to provoke Muslims?” 
(Nianias, 2015). From this extract, it is clear that AC sees the attack as retaliation with 
a just cause. “Why did…provoke Muslims?” insinuating that one should know the 
consequences of provocation. He also referred to the terrorists who orchestrated 9/11 
as “magnificent martyrs” (Nianias, 2015). Furthermore, he called Central News 
Network (CNN) present Brian Stelter “shallow” because Stelter took offense to jokes 
AC made about 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings – AC maintains that "Under divine law it 
is allowed to [joke about] 9/11, whereas insulting the prophet is not allowed " 
(Anthony, 2014).  
On the third step one is again looking at the displacement of aggression. With regards 
to AC, one cannot see it entirely as anger or frustration – he berates the non-Muslims 
and British lifestyle for not accepting what he sees as natural and logical. AC seems 
to focus on Britain. He asserts, "Britain is double haram [forbidden] because they are 
anathema to God's law," said Choudary. "They're not implementing it. They are 
violating its sanctity and therefore this is war against Allah and his messenger” 
(Moon, 2013). AC views the British way of life as inferior, and believes that the 
Islamic State has more to offer, despite facts proving otherwise. 
Everybody gets about $500 a month free of charge, no questions asked. Iraq 
and Syria can afford it as they have oil. You’re given free food, clothing and 
shelter. You get a free house and electricity, gas and water. You also get 
income support, I mean, you don’t even get housing free of charge here. It’s a 
much better society there. Alcohol, gambling, pornography and drugs, are 
completely eradicated (The Clarion Project, 2014).  
AC referred to the British army and Muslims in that army as ‘apostates”. AC seems to 
consider himself a holy warrior who is saving the UK and its citizens by advocating 
Islam and trying to implement Sharia Law.  
On the fourth floor one finds recruitment into the terror organisation. AC’s path to 
radicalisation began the day he met Omar Bakri Mohammed. He was radicalized and 
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has now formed his own groups. AC is now infamous for spreading his radical 
opinions – his tweets are proof of this. He has stated: “Non-Muslims associate with 
God: OBJECTS: Sun, cow & cross etc PEOPLE: Kings, Presidents & Prime 
Ministers etc IDEAS: Democracy, Freedom etc”, “The only true monotheists are 
Muslims. Hence, we call Christians, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists to give up 
their polytheism and embrace Islam”, “There is nothing called a Muslim in the British 
army, they are apostates, it's an oxymoron. As Allah says [EMQ 5:51]”, “If you differ 
any aspect of the Qur'an or Sunnah (actions of the Prophet) then that means your 
Fitrah (natural disposition) has been polluted!”, Under Shari'ah, no one can propagate 
falsehood openly eg Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, 
Democracy, Freedom, H Rights, Atheism”, “Apostates from Islam also include: 
British Police, British Army, Navy & Airforce, Judges judging by kufr, MP's, Those 
helping in "Prevent"” (@anjemchoudary). There are many more examples of AC 
views as shared on Twitter, however in order to provide a succinct account, only a 
few have been used.   
Approximately 70 people associated with AC’s network have been convicted of 
terrorism or related charges in the UK, other have been killed in acts outside the UK 
in the last 14 years – it is also reported that the 7/7 bombers were connected to AC’s 
associations (The Clarion Project, 2014). 
On the last floor one becomes psychologically ready to commit an act of terror. AC 
does not seem to want to be involved directly in the holy war he punts. Waldmann 
(2010) notes that very few individuals join and partake in the violence of a armed 
radial organisation, however there are many people willing to support the violence via 
delivery of weapons, financial aid, supporting the fighters morally and with physical 
sustenance, offering them sanctuary and making use of propaganda for their cause. 
AC seems more comfortable encouraging others - “I believe you can support your 
brothers and sisters verbally and financially. If I really believed it was an ideological 
obligation to travel abroad and wage jihad, I would do it. I had many opportunities” – 
(Crowcroft, 2015). Despite this observation, one should not neglect AC’s exceptional 
psychological distancing. With regards to the murder and attempted decapitation of 
British soldier Lee Rigby, AC praised his attacker (Adebolago) as a “martyr” and said 
Rigby would “burn in hellfire”. He went further to say: 
	 70	
Allah said very clearly in the Koran 'Don't feel sorry for the non-Muslims.' So 
as an adult non-Muslim, whether he is part of the Army or not part of the 
Army, if he dies in a state of disbelief then he is going to go to the hellfire. 
That's what I believe so I'm not going to feel sorry for non-Muslims. We invite 
them to embrace the message of Islam. If they don't, then obviously if they die 
like that they're going to the hellfires (Kern, 2015).  
On the 6th of September 2016, AC was sentenced to five and a half years in prison for 
soliciting support for ISIS (Castle, 2016). 
Table 2: table showing factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) 
and the Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to AC. 
Anjem Choudary FACTOR FOUND 
WITHIN THE RCM 
PROGRESS ON THE 
STAIRCASE 
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6.3 Causal Factors at the Macro Level  
6.3.1 Poor Integration 
In Britain, it is often said that Muslims need to embrace British values whereby 
radicalisation is constructed as the result of youths who are alienated and live in 
segregated communities. “In the public sphere, terrorism, radicalism and extremism 
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became entangled with notions of integration, segregation and multiculturalism, and 
because terrorism was the number one national security priority for Britain” (Lynch, 
2013, p.243). According to Inglehart and Norris (2009) the UK was particularly upset 
that the perpetrators of events such as the Madrid (2004) and London bombings (one 
of the bombers being MSK) (2005) were British-born second-generation Muslim 
youths. These events raised fears that second-generation Muslims living in isolated 
urban communities were separated from democratic societies. These events “also 
played on deeper anxieties about Britain’s growing diversity and apparent loss of a 
cohesive identity” (Briggs & Birdwell, 2009). MSK was the son of Pakistani 
immigrants and lived in a relatively poor, immigrant populated area BBC News, 
2007; Staun, 2008). It is thought that alienation may lead to the development of 
sympathy with extremist Islamic movements (Inglehart & Norris, 2009). According to 
Haider (2015, p.2) “The separation of religion from culture of origin has led some 
Muslim diasporas to identify with the global Islamic community and show solidarity 
to Islamic war victims worldwide. This could lead to radicalisation when combined 
with anti-Imperialistic phraseology”. In an effort to distinguish possible extremists 
from the rest of British society, the focus fell upon an individual’s parents’ or 
grandparents’ country of origin. By trying to understand radicalisation, immigration 
history became the focus of attention. By focusing on the foreign heritage of 
individuals, their loyalty to Britain and its’ values were questioned. In order to 
understand radicalisation, the focus fell on their otherness. By focusing on the 
Muslim youth and their perceived vulnerability to radicalisation, immigrants were 
constructed as problematic with regards to terrorism and radicalisation (Lynch, 2013). 
According to Inglehart and Norris (2009) cultural integration theories propose that 
immigrants absorb the norms and values that dominate their host society – especially 
with regards to inter-generational cases. On the other hand there are theories of 
divergence, which suggest that there are prevailing norms for each nation that are 
shaped by collective history, language and religious traditions. Therefore, some 
migrants are not likely to forsake these values when they settle elsewhere. According 
to an opinion poll (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006, as cited in Briggs & Birdwell, 
2009) based on a religious-cultural negativity index of seven characteristics, British 
Muslims were more likely to view a conflict between Islam and modernity, thereby 
identifying firmly on religious rather than national lines which AC and MSK both 
share. 
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According to Choudhury (2007) the devaluation and vilification of Muslims and the 
religion of Islam is an external factor that has increased in-group solidarity and 
identification based on religion. For young Muslim men, the “Muslim” part of their 
identity may provide a sense of masculinity, and be a way to ward off the appearance 
of weakness or docility – “We are at war and I am a soldier” (Mohammed Sidique 
Khan, 2005; BBC News, 2005a). The politics inherent in Muslim identity can 
encourage integration. Actions surrounding the demands for religious accommodation 
have mobilized Muslim communities towards political engagement. Due to this 
mobilisation being based in religion and ethnicity, it may be seen to perpetuate 
segregation. Choudhury (2007) asserts that this form of political engagement 
encourages other forms of civic and political engagement.  
As stated earlier it is difficult to achieve assimilation and multiculturalism. When the 
parallel society is developed, coupled with the marginalisation of immigrant groups 
this may result in the growth of “ghettoized diaspora communities” (Haider, 2015, 
p.6). It is important to note that a lack of integration is more likely the result of 
political, economic and social exclusion as opposed to religion or culture 
(Hemmingsen, 2010). The isolation of these communities allows for well-thought-out 
recruitment by radical to go unnoticed for long periods of time (Haider, 2015). The 
difficulties of forming a cohesive identity may be what makes young people 
vulnerable to radicalisation (Briggs & Birdwell, 2009; Aslam-Motala, 2011).  
For young people the search for their identity is how they define their relationship 
with the world. This process does not necessarily lead to radicalisation, as the path 
towards radicalisation requires interpersonal interaction with those who may influence 
the radicalisation process (Choudhury, 2007), however it is also possible to self-
radicalise.  
In his study of the literature surrounding radicalisation and identity, Choudhury 
(2007) makes note of four important aspects. First, radicalisation coincides with the 
search for identity at a moment of crisis in one’s life. Second, this crisis involves a 
sense of not belonging or being accepted, which may be intensified by experiences of 
discrimination, racism or feeling that one has no social mobility. Third, the appeal of 
radical organisations may reflect the ineffectual nature of religious organisations to 
connect with the youth, and help them address their concerns. Fourth, those who are 
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drawn to radical groups appear to novices to the faith, and are unable to accurately 
evaluate the legitimacy of the groups understanding and interpretation of Islam.  
When discussing her research on Muslim youth and Jihad at a TEDxExeter 
conference, Deeyah Khan (2016) stated:  
I found broken people… these young men were torn apart trying to bridge the 
gaps between their families and the countries they were born in. And what I 
also learnt is that extremist groups, terrorist groups are taking advantage of 
these feelings of our young people and cynically channelling that towards 
violence. “Come to us!” they say, “Reject both sides – your family and your 
country because they reject you. For your family, their honour is more 
important than you. And for your country – a real Norwegian, Brit or a French 
person will always be white – never you”. They are also promising our young 
people the things that they crave – significance, heroism, a sense of belonging 
and purpose – a community that loves and accepts them. They make the 
powerless feel powerful, the invisible and the silent are finally seen and heard. 
 
6.4 Causes at a Macro Level: Social Factors 
6.4.1 Self-categorisation and Social Identity 
The Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard of the 
Muslim community; they are a lost generation, unmoored from traditional 
societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does not meet their 
expectations (Roy, 2005).  
At the heart of Islamic radicalisation and its collective actions lies the problematic 
issue of group membership and identification with others. One must take into 
consideration the effects of not having a positive social identity – the struggle to find 
an identity, the need to belong and to avoid rejection. This is a problem many Muslim 
youth face in the western world. The crisis may lie in the conflict within their ethnic 
and cultural background whilst having the fear of being rejected by western society 
(Roy, 2005; Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).  
According to Fukuyama (2006) issues surrounding identity are not found in Muslim 
societies. In a traditional Muslim society, one is given an identity by one’s parents 
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and social environment – one’s identity is linked in particular to a branch of Islam 
faith and it is not a choice. Islam is a legalistic religion conforming to externally 
determined localised social rules.  Identity becomes a salient problem when these 
individuals leave their societies and enter the western world. One’s identity as a 
Muslim is not externally supported, instead one is encouraged to conform to western 
norms, resulting in a disconnect between one’s inner identity and one’s behaviour in 
the new environment. This may account for the constant questioning of what is 
allowed (Halal) and what is not (Haram) – individuals are not able to conduct 
themselves free of doubt, in these new and unprecedented situations. According to 
Grattan (2009) the indigenous and migrant community may have different concerns – 
the uncertainty of a communal, cultural and economic nature, and the other concerned 
with issues of faith, community, culture, religion and identity, respectively. Grattan 
(2009) argues, with reference to contemporary Great Britain, that these concerns may 
give rise to ethnocentrism, hatred, violence, xenophobia and nationalism. Radical 
Islam often attempts to clear up this confusion and answer the question of identity, 
therefore it should be viewed as a form of identity politics. First-generation 
immigrants, for example, generally carry their traditions and cultural nuances to their 
new homes. Their children however, may be at odds with their roots whilst not having 
fully integrated into their new society. This confusion can be the catalyst for an 
interest in the universalistic ideology of jihadism – “you are a member of a global 
umma defined by adherence to a universal Islamic doctrine that has been stripped of 
all of its local customs, saints, traditions and the like” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 3). 
According to Haider (2015) adhering to religion among second and third generation 
groups is seen as a choice, as opposed to a feeling of loyalty towards the country of 
origin. These conditions allow for the separation of religion from the cultures of 
origin. Cultural continuity from one generation to the next, including the challenges 
of gaining access to the culture of the host country can result in a cultural void. 
Ethnicity without culture can provide the foundation for radicalisation whereby 
culture is replaced with violence.  
Abbas (2012) argues that radicalisation is fuelled by Islamophobia and vice versa.  
Since the 1960s, governments in Britain shaped policy and practice for ethnic 
minority groups based on various strategies of anti-immigration and anti-
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discrimination legislation on the one hand, and with a programme of 
assimilation, integration and, most recently, multiculturalism on the other 
hand. In the 2000s, various attempts were made by outspoken political 
commentators to suggest that ‘multiculturalism is dead’ (cf. Lentin and Titley 
2011)  (Abbas, 2012) 
In response, he argues, British Muslims were motivating each other to participate in, 
and integrate into society. One may argue that the Islamophobia – the fear of Muslims 
– stems from a fear of multiculturalism and the inherent incompatibility of such 
differences. Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) argue that Islamophobia combines 
the dislike of a religion and the active dislike of individuals who affiliate with that 
religion. Furthermore, it involves Islam being viewed as a static religion, resistant to 
change; Islam is viewed as ‘other’ as well as inferior, primitive, sexist, aggressive, 
militant and irrational; Islam is viewed as political ideology used for militancy, and 
anti-Muslim hostility is viewed as normal/natural given the circumstances (Githens-
Mazer & Lambert, 2010). Integration and acceptance has proven difficult due to racist 
hostility, giving British Muslims little choice but to retreat into their communities 
(Abbas, 2012). According to Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) there has been a rise 
in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crimes, which can create divisions throughout 
Europe, “alienating friends, neighbours and political partners” (p.7). They assert that 
negative portrayals of London as Londonistan; Muslims as terrorists and/or terrorist 
sympathisers are the motivation for anti-Muslim hate crimes and Islamophobia. 
Haider (2015) asserts that counter-terrorism measures that disproportionately affect 
Muslims and encourage anti-Muslim sentiment contribute to feelings of exclusion and 
vilification, which may only serve to strengthen their identification with Islam. Abbas 
(2012) argues that one must then consider the notion of Islamic revivalism. This is a 
means of protest against injustices towards Muslim identity and culture, whereby 
Muslims assert an identity and recognition, using language or slogans that are seen as 
typical of Islam. According to Hemmingsen (2010) when individuals come together 
in this way and engage in conflict, they are forming under a shared ‘shared language’ 
(p. 35) whereby they can share and relieve the tension of their lack of recognition, 
whilst gaining acknowledgement from the group and their surroundings. This type of 
protest is liberating “because they are now a group causing conflict – and narrate 
themselves as living in a future in which they are recognised for what they are. This 
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represents a way to restore the positive self- relation” (Hemmingsen, 2010, pp. 35-
36). The primary grievances include barriers to social mobility, economic hardship, 
and a lack of political and or legal freedoms. These revivalisms are seen as a panicked 
reaction by Muslims who feel their religion and identity are being threatened, the 
Rushdie Affair is an example. Muslims all over the world have to deal with negative 
representations in the media and popular culture. According to Haider (2015) social 
media-propaganda can play an important role in the spread of radical ideology, with 
one of the most popular means of spreading radical messages being Youtube. One 
must also take into account the possibility of vilification. This occurs when the 
actions of a minority create widespread negative feelings and discriminatory 
responses towards specific groups. The process of vilification facilitates the alienation 
of groups and radicalisation. Events such as 9/11 and the resistance to the occupation 
of Iraq and Palestine portray Muslims as terrorists (Abbas, 2012). A survey on several 
Muslim groups found that since 9/11, 80% of Muslim respondents felt they were 
subjected to Islamophobia; 68% felt they had been seen and treated differently; and 
32% felt discriminated against at UK airports (FAIR, 2004, as cited in Briggs & 
Birdwell, 2009). Islamophobia can be viewed as the fuel of radicalisation. Fear as a 
product of the media as well as social injustices are forcing individuals to retreat into 
their secular communities, continuing the cycle of racism and increasing the chance of 
radicalisation (Abbas, 2012). 
 
6.4.2 The Role of Prisons 
AC’s threat to “radicalise everyone in prison" (Kern, 2015) may be perceived as an 
intimidation technique, however recruiting prison inmates for terrorist organisations is 
not a new phenomenon (Cuthbertson, 2004; Cilluffo et al., 2007; Mulcahy, 
Merrington & Bell, 2013). “The prison environment is an incubator for creating a 
dedicated and hardened terrorist, offering ideal conditions for both the initial 
recruitment and radicalisation of new members and for the further indoctrination and 
training of existing cadres” (Cuthbertson, 2004, p.19). It is however a phenomenon 
that is poorly understood due to the limited information available to researchers 
(Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013). 
Prisoners are particularly attractive targets for extremists because they form a captive 
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audience that displays traits that make them vulnerable to radicalisation, such as anti-
social attitudes, violent propensities, social isolation and alienation. Reasons as to 
why prisoners are susceptible to radicalisation in prison involve the very nature of life 
in prison - despondency, isolation and a sense of uncertainty (Brandon, 2009; 
Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013). One must also take into account that prisoners 
may need to join gangs for protection, allowing extremists to influence them further 
(Cilluffo et al, 2007). Furthermore Awan (2013) asserts that the search for identity 
may lead to inmates allying themselves with those who seem to have more power or 
influence within the prison environment. Those who lack an identity may begin to 
feel isolated and feel the need to join a gang where acts of violence are justified. 
A study by conducted by the Quilliam Foundation (Brandon, 2009) found that the 
cause of radicalisation in prisons is the result of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors – the ‘pull 
factors involve existing radicals to pull others into their worldview, while the ‘push’ 
factors are those which lead ordinary people, Muslim and non-Muslim towards 
radicalisation (Brandon, 2009). According to Precht (2007, p.60) “Prisons are “crisis” 
environments that create a desire for belonging, group identity, protection and 
religious guidance”. Extremists actively seek out new members, with new arrivals in 
prison being approached and offered social and moral support. This companionship 
may lead to the offer of spiritual advice or religious guidance, which inevitably turns 
to radical ideology.  Concurrently, some extremists will aim to become the leaders of 
a given Muslim prison population. Abu Hamza, a convicted terrorist, for example, led 
food and other injustice protests in Belmarsh. This behaviour gives them a moral 
authority over the other Muslim prisoners, and grants them the appearance of role 
models (Brandon, 2009). Mulcahy, Merrington and Bell (2013) concur with Brandon 
(2009) and credit the vulnerability of new prisoners to physical and emotion trauma. 
When an individual is incarcerated they experience acute and chronic of stress, quite 
possibly resulting in them becoming more impressionable and vulnerable. In this state 
it is easy for recruiters to evaluate their likeliness of conforming to the extremist 
group. Furthermore, unbalanced emotional states – hate, anger, fear doubt, 
humiliation, etcetera – make an ideal target for recruiters (Mulcahy, Merrington & 
Bell, 2013). There are also some issues within the prison system itself that help 
bolster the appeal of radical Islam. One of these issues is the disconnect between the 
religious sensibilities of Muslim prisoners and the security needs of Correctional 
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Services, for example, strip searches, the presence and use of canines and the 
provision of Halal food. Some other errors involve training and using other inmates 
(suspected terrorists) as ‘listeners’ to mentor others, and using some known radicals 
as ‘go-betweens’ for prison staff and other Muslim inmates (Brandon, 2009).  
Once individuals have adopted extremist ideologies in prison, their radicalisation 
becomes increasingly entrenched as they distance themselves from less extreme 
inmates, begin reading hard-line Islamist literature and holding small study circles 
with their fellow extremists (Brandon, 2009).  One must however, acknowledge a 
different angle. Some prisoners will adopt Islamism during their sentence in order to 
benefit from the protection and support it offers them, better food, or longer time out 
of cells (which should be used for prayer) (Jones, 2014). Upon release those who had 
converted to Islam may not follow the path to extremism – a small percentage will 
become radicalized with an even smaller percentage joining terrorist organisations 
(Brandon, 2009; Mulcahy, Merrington & Bell, 2013). Furthermore, not all adoptions 
of the faith are unscrupulous. Religion is a way to help people abandon unbeneficial 
behaviours and adopt a new lifestyle. The idea that the adoption of a religion will lead 
to radicalisation and terrorism is unsupported. Furthermore, it would be ignoring the 
differences between religious observance, radicalisation and terrorism (Brandon, 
2009; Jones, 2014).  
The concept of radicalisation in prison is complex and there is no discernible link 
between radicalisation and prison Imams, or converting to Islam. Little is known 
about radicalisation in the prison system. One could even call it conjecture in light of 
little evidence. This is not to say there is no risk – As dynamic and charismatic as AC 
is, research shows it is more a case of whether there is a significant risk (Precht, 2007; 
Rappaport, Veldhuis & Guiora, 2012; Jones, 2014). As stated earlier, the nature of 
prison life can make one receptive to radicalisation – frustration, discrimination and 
sadness. One of the greatest concerns is what happens to prisoners who have 
converted or are attracted to radicalized ideologies once they leave the prison 
environment (Precht, 2007). Vulnerability to radicalisation does not cease after one is 
released from prison. Upon leaving prison some individuals find they have little 
monetary, emotional or familial support. Individuals can find support through 
community and religious groups. Without these vital aspects of support – keeping in 
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mind it is possible for an extremist group to appear as a legitimate support 
organisation - they may reoffend or go further down the path to radicalisation. 
(Cilluffo et al, 2007; Precht, 2007). With regards to those who do commit acts of 
terror upon leaving prison such as Richard Reid, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
their radicalisation occurred primarily due to their incarceration (Jones 2014).  
6.5 South African Case Studies 
6.5.1 MUSTAFA MOHAMED (also known as MUSTAFA JONKER) 
Without a history of MJ, it is not entirely possible to apply the stair case theory. One 
is able to see that, like MSK, on the first step MJ perceived injustices with regards to 
the South African government (the African National Congress (ANC)). He views the 
ANC as treacherous, serving only the needs of middle and upper class black South 
Africans, whilst being puppeteer by Europe and the United States.  Accordingly, the 
result of this betrayal, according to MJ, is a widening gap between the rich and the 
poor, with the accompanying crime statistics.  
MJ sees Islam as a means of combating the “ Crusader-Zionist alliance and her pawns 
in power”. One may assume from this interview that MJ adopted a radical 
interpretation of Islam. According to Solomon (2013) upon inspecting the views of 
MJ one will find traces of Wahhabist ideology, anti-Semitism, the commitment to 
violent change, an inaccurate view of history and a limited understanding of 
economics and politics. It is likely that the resentment he feels towards the 
government and Western powers legitimize his feelings of injustice and choice to 
advocate a radical view of Islam.  
On the second step one seeks a solution, or a means to correct the injustice – perhaps 
viewing terrorism as a feasible option. “I began advocating as Allah 
commanded…pride in it” shows that being labelled as a terrorist does not phase MJ. 
He views it as the outcome of a honourable deed – “Ours is a blessed terror”. His 
rationality is that acts of terror are committed for a great cause under a sense of 
responsibility whereby one should feel proud. He may like AJ, not be guilty of, or 
perpetrate an act of terror however; the support of this rationale may encourage others 
to do so, whereby the supporters receive the “benefits”. 
The third step may be viewed in his displacement of aggression towards the United 
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States and the Jewish community. He views the US as oppressive and as the cause of 
suffering for Muslims in South Africa and all over the world. There is not enough 
information available to take MJ to the fourth step. From this interview one can 
recognize how passionate he is in his beliefs. Even though one cannot ascertain 
whether MJ is part of, or trying to develop a terror organisation/movement, his views 
and vocal nature should be cause for concern. This interview should not be dismissed 
as representing a powerless or insignificant minority (Solomon, 2013).  
Table 3: table showing factors of the Root Cause Model (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) 
and the Staircase to Terrorism Model (Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to MJ. 
Mustafa Mohamed FACTOR FOUND 
WITHIN THE RCM 
PROGRESS ON THE 
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6.5.2 BRANDON-LEE AND TONY-LEE THULSIE 
On the first step on is looking at feelings of relative deprivation, as well as perceived 
injustices or dissatisfaction. Begg, in reference to the twins, said “they had problems 
with South Africa, specifically with the upcoming elections. Their new teachers said 
voting was forbidden” (Hoskens, 2016). The twins also felt that “imams [were] not 
fulfilling their duties” and said “good Muslim [’s] had to speak up about the abuse of 
‘our people‘ [in Palestine and Syria]” (Hoskens, 2016). The twins seemed to be upset 
about the way Muslims were being treated all over the world, and felt that the imams 
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in South Africa were not doing enough to aid them. As mentioned previously, Al-
Lami (2009) notes that Muslim youth who partake in extremist violence are religious 
novices – the twins were new to the religion, as they had converted. Their superficial 
understanding of Islam left them unable to assess the legitimacy of the interpretation 
of Islam offered by their chosen teachers and the internet, which makes them 
vulnerable to radicalisation and extremist violence (Al-Lami, 2009).  
On the second step one would begin to look for a way to address the perceived 
injustice or dissatisfaction. Begg had said that the twins were looking for purpose and 
wanted to be soldiers for their religion (Hoskens, 2016). The source of knowledge 
they chose, Sheik Ahmed Musa Jibril, is an Arab-American Islamist preacher based in 
the US. Jibril does not actively call for violent but he does support foreign fighters 
and validates the Syrian conflict with great emotion in an articulate and compelling 
fashion utilizing religious or sectarian idioms. Jibril’s attitude towards the West is 
combative and distrusting – he fuels the idea of a conspiracy against Muslims and 
Islam. Jibril is entitled to his opinion, however others may view his opinion (coupled 
with his status as a religious leader) as a legitimisation for joining a jihadist group 
(Cater, Maher & Neumann, 2014).  
The third step is about the displacement of aggression. It has already been stated that 
the twins were unhappy with South Africa and its’ imams. On the last step one is 
looking at recruitment into a terrorist organisation. There is not enough information to 
ascertain if the twins were members of IS, although TLT was in regular contact under 
the pseudonym Simba (Henderson, 2016a).  
The case of the Thulsie twins is an important trial for South Africa as the way in 
which it is handled will have an impact on the way the country is viewed, especially 
by the Muslim community and IS – as Martin Ewi (Security Analyst and Senior 
Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies) pointed out, Islam is not on trial – 
“People want to see justice being carried out, because if they don’t see justice, some 
might see this as a blatant attack on Islam…government has to remove religion from 
this case because it is not about Islam. They were not arrested for being Muslim. Once 
people feel that injustice has been done, that too could radicalize some people to go to 
the extent of actually carrying out the attacks” (Udeh, 2016). 
	 82	
 Opperman (2016) points out a few mistakes that have been made in the case against 
the Thulsie twins. Firstly, the photographs used as evidence to show the accused as 
posing with a rifle and bomb vest, turned out to be paintball equipment. Secondly, the 
state had admitted to using foreign intelligence with regards to the evidence of TLT 
making contact with members of IS – Opperman (2016) states that it is rare for 
foreign intelligence to be used in a court of law. Thirdly, the single witness, Ronaldo 
Smith has since claimed he was coerced into making a statement about the twins, is 
not in a witness protection programme. Fourthly, bank statements were used as an 
argument to show financial support towards IS and the enactment of the supposed 
terror attack. Lastly, and the most troubling is that no experts of terrorism were 
consulted, with Detective Warrant Officer Wynand Olivier stating that one could 
Google “Jihadists”. This statement shows a lack, of not only understanding, but also a 
lack of procedure and experience with terror related crimes.  
Opperman (2016) notes a lack of knowledge with regards to IS and its potential to 
orchestrate acts of terror in South Africa. As mentioned previously South Africa is 
more at risk for the acts of a lone wolf (Piper, 2015). According to Opperman (2016) 
if foreign intelligence does indeed reveal contact with a high-ranking member of IS 
South Africa should be deeply concerned. However current information reveals a 
focus on the Middle East, Asia and Europe. And with regards to the bank statements, 
it is unlikely to link a cash transfer to planning or execution of an act of terror. The 
on-going investigation may give the impression of a lack of damning evidence. 
Essentially, Opperman (2016) views this case as a “watershed case, [possibly] for all 
the wrong reasons” as the evidence presented does not fit the modus operandi of IS. 
This case will be publicized and scrutinized by many considering that South Africa 
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6.6 Causal Factors at the Macro Level  
6.6.1 Poor Integration 
According to Haider (2015) assimilation and multiculturalism are the most common 
models of integration. The goal of assimilation is to form a national identity that 
minimises religious or cultural differences. Multiculturalism on the other hand, aims 
to allow groups to maintain their distinct identities. It is difficult for both of these 
models to be achieved, the result of which is a lack of social cohesion- and much like 
in the UK the formation of a homogenous parallel society.  
According to Vahed (2013) in South Africa, approximately ninety-per cent of 
Muslims can be classified as either ‘Indian’ or ‘Malay’ Muslim; with the remaining 
ten per cent being classified as African. According to the racial classification system 
in South Africa, the Malay’s would form part of the coloured community. According 
to Vahed (2013) “South African Muslims are deeply divided by race, class, ethnicity, 
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language, politics, education, and beliefs”, a sentiment, which is shared by MJ. 
Division and a lack of integration are found within the Muslim community. There is a 
perception amongst African Muslims that Islam is predominantly an Indian religion. 
The Africans who do embrace Islam are viewed as “colonized” by the Indians, and 
wonder why the Indian Muslim community do not extend a helping hand to matters 
closer to home than they do with Muslims from other countries faced with natural 
disasters, wars and misfortune (Vahed, 2013). African Muslims sometimes feel 
alienated from the Indian and Malay Muslim circles, with many converts finding they 
are not welcomed the way in which they were expecting (Aslam-Motala, 2011).  
Muslims in South Africa have only recently begun to negotiate their identities as 
South African Muslims. Many being fourth generation or more have no ties to India 
or Pakistan, therefore they must begin to form their identity.  For many years in 
Europe and the United States there has been a struggle to form a cohesive identity 
around Muslim culture and tradition and Western ideologies. Being a good Muslim 
may constitute following tradition – traditions set in the country of origin. The 
younger generation may be in a state of confusion, on one hand there are the 
traditions explained by scholars and organisations and on the other, Muslims who say 
they are bi-cultural and have combined Western discourse with Islamic tradition and 
practice. There seems to be a gap whereby the information they receive via 
traditionalists is in contradiction with reality – for example, the Thulsie twins believed 
that South African imams were doing a disservice to Muslims around the world by 
not speaking up about the violence that is being experienced by the global Muslim 
community (Hoskens, 2016). There are scholars who believe in, and are becoming 
more relevant, speaking about current events, political participation and social 
problems affecting Muslims in South Africa today (Aslam-Motala, 2011). South 
African Muslims have integrated well, in contrast to some British Muslims. 
According to Hellyer (2015) South African Muslims form an integral part of society – 
they are patriotic and do not find difficulty in assimilating this with their specificities 
as Muslims. Due to the long history of Muslims in South Africa, there may an 
established precedent that prevents these individuals from feeling alienated. This does 
not mean the risk of radicalisation is not present. There are undoubtedly others who 
share the views of individuals like MJ who believes the South African government 
has sold itself to multinational corporations and is solely interested in the welfare of 
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black South Africans.  
It is not clear as to how many South Africans are already fighting alongside radical 
groups in Syria and Iraq. A young girl from Cape Town was stopped at the airport on 
her way to Syria to support ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).  Therefore, even 
though South African Muslims have integrated well into society, the threat of radical 
groups must not be underestimated (Hellyer, 2015). For example, once the Thulsie 
twins had developed an interest in the radical Islamist ideology, they began to pull 
away from friends and family, and adopted views in line with the Islamist ideology – 
they began to separate themselves from their old lives.  
One may argue that the lack of a terrorist attack may be an attempt of these radical 
groups to not ruin the current arrangement they have with South Africa. It would 
make little sense to attack the country which provides safety, funding and travel 
documentation. (Piper, 2015).   
6.6.2 Poverty 
According to Bhui, Warfa and Jones (2014) there are two main hypotheses that could 
explain the sympathy or support for radical thoughts and behaviours. The first posits 
that inequality (social and health), poverty, discrimination, unemployment and poor 
social networks produce grievances, which enable people to sympathise with radical 
behaviours. MJ was particularly aggravated by the gap between the rich and poor in 
South Africa, which according to him is “a direct result of the government’s 
neoliberal capitalist policies” resulting in crime which led him to “advocating as 
Allah commanded direct action against the Crusader-Zionist alliance and her pawns in 
power and this is the background behind my being labeled a terrorist” (Solomon, 
2013).  
The second suggests that radicalisation and the consequent support it receives are 
political processes shaped by influential people. Many authors (Krueger & 
Malecˇkova ́, 2003; Piazza, 2006; Bhui, Warfa & Jones, 2014) support the latter 
theory, stating that the connection, if any, between poverty, education and terrorism is 
weak.  
Krueger and Malecˇkova ́ (2003) assert that terrorism is a form of violent political 
engagement, whereby those who participate are more likely to be wealthy and 
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educated (Krueger & Malecˇkova ́, 2003; Berrebi, 2007; Bhui, Warfa & Jones, 2014). 
A study by Bhui, Warfa and Jones (2014) supports this, by finding that those who are 
young, wealthy and educated are more likely to sympathise with radical thoughts and 
behaviours. One cannot assume that poor political conditions or poverty alone, are 
enough to lead an individual towards terrorism. If material conditions alone were the 
cause of terrorism, the poorest individuals living in the most impoverished areas 
would be responsible for many acts of terror - and this is not the case (Moghaddam, 
2005).  Berrebi (2007) offers an explanation as to why those who are educated and 
wealthy would sympathise with radical ideologies and partake in terrorist activities. 
Education may increase the likelihood of terrorist activity as it may advocate a certain 
political message, increasing individual’s chances of joining a terrorist organisation. 
In such a case it may encourage radical thought whilst “only on the margin increase 
productive opportunities in the labour market.” Furthermore, highly educated 
individuals may be more aware of, and be agitated by the implications of odd 
instances of injustice and discrimination. In a similar way, a sense of social 
responsibility is developed whereby those who are educated may feel the need to 
assist with a certain cause. Accordingly, one could reverse the connection between 
education and terrorism – an individual may be interested in joining a terror 
organisation, but may need to educate themselves further to be a valuable member of 
an organisation. Conversely, terrorism may be the response to limited opportunities 
with regards to occupation – this would apply to qualified individuals who cannot 
succeed for reasons such as their social standing or heritage. One must also consider 
that participation may not be a case of differential motivation but rather a choice by 
the terror organisation itself. Apart from education, wealth is attractive to terror 
organisations in terms of monetary investment. Lastly, poorer individuals may be 
concerned with more pressing daily worries such as supporting their families to 
devote themselves to the terror organisation (Berrebi, 2007).  
It is suggested that terrorism (the possible result of radicalisation) be viewed as a 
response to long-term feelings of indignity and the resultant frustration, as opposed to 




6.7 Causes at a Macro Level: Social Factors 
6.7.1 Self-categorisation and Social Identity 
 
According to Achmat (2014) South Africa appears to be a symbol of peaceful co-
existence with an engaging Muslim community. This situation was not achieved 
instantly nor easily. In the twentieth century, the Apartheid system which was 
introduced by the National Party, decided that the ethnic and religious identity of 
Muslims in South Africa were inferior. From institutionalised racism, deprivation of 
rights – including the right to practice Islam – discrimination and prejudice, there has 
been great progress for South African Muslims as they, like all South Africans are 
now free and equal contributors to their society. MJ on the other hand believes that 
democratic South Africa is a “symbolic multicultural government which is dictated to 
by and passes laws on behalf of mainly European and American companies, the same 
Crusader nations pillaging Afghanistan and Iraq today” (Solomon, 2013). 
There have been a few notable experiences of discrimination in South Africa in 2016, 
two of which will be discussed. In June 2016, a Christian school in Gauteng was 
accused of Islamophobia. The schools’ head of student affairs (Bob Fuller) had sent a 
letter to the students’ parents, which activist Yusuf Abramjee found quite insulting. 
The letter had outlined the newly built mosque nearby, thereafter he urged parents to  
pray for Muslims to come to the saving knowledge of Jesus Christ…[The 
mosque] was recently finished, and every day around 1:00 (sic) we hear the 
voice of the Imam calling all faithful Muslims to prayer with the mournful 
stains of his song broadcast via loudspeaker throughout our suburb…can’t 
help but think of the vast difference between Muslim and Christian 
prayers…Muslims pray in the hope that it might earn them salvation, while 
Christians can pray anywhere at any time in any words we may choose with 
the assurance that every word is heard because of our personal relationship 
with God…I could go on, but I think you get my point. I am actually grateful 
for this daily reminder to pray for Muslims to come to a saving knowledge of 
Jesus Christ and to intercede for Christian missionaries, some of whom I know 
personally, who are daily reaching out to Muslims – often at the risk of their 
lives…Especially with Ramadan happening 11 July through 9 August, I invite 
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you to do the same. And why not encourage your children to also participate? 
Our prayers can and do make a difference! (Singh, 2016). 
Abramjee considered this letter to be offensive and encouraging of hatred and 
intolerance – essentially Islamophobic. The school later apologised, with Fuller 
stating that Christians have their right to pray for the salvation of those of other faiths. 
He did apologise for his insensitivity stating "The spirit behind the letter was one of 
compassion for individuals, and my prayer is that as Christians, we will continue to 
engage in a positive way with people of all faiths and in a way that will build bridges 
and not create divisions. Once again, if I was unsuccessful in expressing this 
understanding, I apologise” (Singh, 2016b). 
In Cape Town, Jess Mouneimne claims the need to hide her Muslim identity from 
prospective clients in order to procure business. On one occasion a man had asked 
where her surname was from – she stated she was Lebanese and her husband was 
from Lebanon. The prospective client then said “"Yeah but he is a Christian right so 
we can do business together still. It's those 'Mozzies' that are the problem!" He then 
rambled on for about 10 minutes about how he has done business with Muslims 
countless times and how every time they screwed him over. He also told me how the 
Christian Lebs may be Arabs but they were okay because they helped the Israelis kill 
the Muslim terrorists” (Mouneimne, 2016).  
According to Readings, Brandon and Phelps (2011) there is confusion around the 
term islamophobia as anti-Muslim prejudice has been conflated with criticizing or 
questioning aspects of the religion, with both aspects being depicted as unacceptable. 
Conflating scrutiny of a religion with prejudice and hatred for its followers is 
problematic as this undermines freedom of speech, furthermore this lack of clarity is 
what Islamists may use, by arguing their critics are irrational and victimising them, 
instead of allowing their political ideology to be criticized. They suggest using the 
term “anti-Muslim prejudice/bigotry/hatred” instead of Islamophobia to avoid 
confusion, they do however assert that:  
It is important that the freedom to criticise religions is preserved – as long as 
that criticism is not used, or understood, to incite hatred, violence or prejudice 
against the individual followers of that religion. It is important for a liberal, 
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democratic society that people are able to publicly criticise Islam and aspects 
of it, just as they are able to criticise Christianity, Buddhism or Scientology, if 
they wish to do so (Readings, Brandon & Phelps, 2011, p.15).  
Hussain (2015) fears that intolerance is spreading in South Africa. On the 18th of 
March 2015, Zainub Prya Dala, a South African author, was attacked after the Time of 
the Writer festival in Durban, after expressing her admiration for the writing style of 
Salman Rushdie. When she stated her admiration for Rushdie’s work, numerous 
teacher and students left the venue. Dala was followed from the festival and harassed 
by three men who proceeded to run her vehicle off the road. When her car had come 
to a halt, two of the men approached her, one holding a knife to her throat. They 
proceeded to hit her in the face with a brick and refer to her as “Rushdie’s bitch”. 
Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses was not received well by the Muslim community, 
leading to a fatwa (Islamic order considered to be the law) being issued to kill him. 
In addition Dr Taj Hargey opened an “Open Mosque” in Cape Town, in 2014 based 
on the founding principles of gender-equality, independence, being inter-cultural and 
non-sectarian. The mosque is not concerned with sexual orientation and has combined 
prayer services (no separation of men and women). According to Hargey “South 
Africans have become Arabised, they think they must wear the burka, must have face 
masks, that men must wear pyjama dresses," said Mr Hargey. "They think that is the 
only version of Islam” (Findlay, 2014). The mosque has been fire-bomber three times 
since opening in 2014. Hargey has received multiple death threats (Haynes, 2015) and 
the Muslim Judicial Council does not consider the open mosque to be a place of 
worship (Findlay, 2014). 
6.7.2 The Role of the Internet  
According to Post (2010) the media and especially the Internet play a vital role in the 
radicalisation of individuals, creating a virtual community of hatred. Weimann (2012) 
asserts that online social networking platforms have become an impressive terrorist 
tool for attracting potential members and followers. The Internet is inexpensive, 
anonymous, ubiquitous, unregulated and uncensored. Any individual or group may 
establish a web presence, with a professional- looking website which would provide 
the appearance of legitimacy (Cilluffo, Cardash & Whitehead, 2007). The Thulsie 
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twins not only made use of online Islamic teaching from Sheikh Musa Jibril, but 
found information on how to bring down buildings and access IS’s webpages 
(Henderson, 2016b).  MJ also found and accessed information on the creation of 
explosives (Solomon, 2013). AC on the other hand, makes use of social media like 
Twitter, Whatsapp and video sharing to amass his own following (Aridi, 2015). 
The popularity of these types of virtual communities is growing, particularly among 
younger demographics, such as the Thulsie twins. According to Torok (2013) 
institutions of radicalisation such as training camps are becoming increasingly 
difficult to operate because they are often targeted. Therefore, the Internet has become 
an essential means of recruitment, radicalisation and training. Jihadist terror groups 
are targeting younger individuals in particular for propaganda and recruitment 
purposes (Weimann, 2012). According to Cilluffo et al (2007) these extremist 
websites are often well designed, ostentatious and visually appealing. Many of these 
websites have chat rooms, music, films, and sometimes even online stores. 
Correspondingly, terrorist groups and their supporters are exploiting predominately 
Western online communities, such as Facebook, MySpace and their Arabic 
counterparts, to spread their message. The purpose of the website is to attract an 
audience which can be exposed to extremist ideas – predominantly that Islam is under 
attack in an environment where the West is relentlessly hostile towards Muslims – 
therefore there is a moral and religious need to assume Jihad (Cilluffo et al, 2007) – a 
view that was common in all the above mentioned cases. According to Meloy and 
Yakeley (2014) because cyber relationships are largely fantasy based, attachments to 
people are not anchored by talking, touching, seeing or feeling, therefore these people 
may not be seen as real objects. The availability of cheap smartphones with affordable 
Internet access means that individuals all over the world can browse and contribute to 
extremist websites without having to be at a desk or have their Internet usage patterns 
detected. Hussain and Saltman (2014) maintain that the majority of terrorist cases 
evolve from a real-world experience that introduces the individual to extremist 
ideology. This does not mean that social media and the Internet do not play an 
important role in the radicalisation; it is just not the origin of the radicalisation 
process. The majority of individuals who visit extremist sites did not stumble across 
them by accident they were likely to have been heading in that direction. In this case, 
the Internet is aiding an already established journey; allowing for the indoctrination 
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and teaching of an ideology (Hussein & Saltman, 2014).   
Miller and Bartlett (2012) assert that though the Internet is a useful and fundamental 
tool for education and communication, there are many non-discerning users. “The key 
to harnessing and exploiting the Internet is to spot the fakes: to know how to tell the 
truth from the lies, and how to negotiate the grey areas of comment, opinion and 
propaganda in between” (Miller & Bartlett, 2012, p.36). There are many ways in 
which individuals are deceived by the information they find on the Internet. 
Generally, information is given credence based upon who supplied it. Unfortunately 
on the Internet, information is sometimes provided anonymously – or under a fake 
identity (and resulting authority). A generational divide also exists, whereby parents 
do not provide the necessary supervision for their children’s’ Internet usage, because 
some believe their children know more about it than they do. In addition, the quality 
of information is often judged by the design of the site, rather than a more rigid 
quality inspection. Essentially the way in which individuals find, comprehend, 
produce and share information has changed drastically, resulting in information of a 
significantly differing quality and agenda (Miller & Bartlett, 2012). 
According to Piper (2015) South Africa may be under threat of lone wolf terrorists. 
The lone wolf terrorist is an individual who acts on their own, without orders from or 
connections to an outside organisation. These individuals may be inspired by a 
particular group but are not under their control (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010). Phillips 
(2011) concurs with Bakker and de Graaf (2010), while further asserting that the lone 
wolf terrorist may or may not identify with a specific terrorist organisation. They may 
also be motivated by an ideology or objective that is not unique in its nature. The 
Internet allows not only for the lone wolf to express their hatred, disdain and disgust 
for the out-group. It also provides a convenient platform for the psychological 
defences of projection (others are at fault), projection identification (others are 
threatening him/her) and splitting (everyone else is bad) (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). 
Torok (2013) asserts that the lone wolf is not driven by poverty or religion – but 
rather a sense of ostracism and the search for significance. Ramakrishna (2013) 
asserts that the operational decentralisation of terrorist planning and action, as well as 
the ideological emphasis on small-cell and lone-wolf endeavours, depend on the 
Internet and social networking to function efficiently. Piper (2015) asserts that an 
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extensive movement of extremists is not a requirement for a lone wolf attack. These 
individuals are difficult to catch (Piper, 2015; Weimann, 2012) and if they are 
disciplined they require no help to carry out their plan.  
Conway and McInerney (2008) conducted a study on Jihadi videos on YouTube in 
order to explore the support for political violence. This study looked into the support 
for martyr-promoting material, in terms of comments and posts on YouTube. Their 
results reveal that majority of those who show support were in between the ages of 18 
and 35, and reside outside the Middle East and North Africa. The largest percentage 
of supporters was found in the United States, followed by the UK. Though this was a 
small exploratory study, what is evident is that Jihadist content has moved beyond the 
traditional website or chat room. Islamist groups are now making use of social 
networking and video sharing which extends their reach substantially to “diaspora 
populations, converts, and political sympathisers” (Conway & McInerney, 2008, p. 
10). 
Similarly, Bermingham, Conway, McInerney, O’Hare and Smeaton (2009) conducted 
a study on how social networking and sentiment may have the potential for online 
radicalisation. According to them, a closer inspection of a media and networking 
platform such as YouTube may reveal content and interaction that is aimed at 
radicalizing individuals who had little or no prior interest in Islamism. Their results 
showed that the group was not functioning as a tool of radicalisation (in line with their 
research questions), but was more inclined towards religious discussions. They assert 
that their study was very focused on a targeted group and they would like to expand 
the breadth of the study in order to build a more complete depiction of the social 
network. The lexicon analysis they utilized made use of the 50 most used terms, 
therefore is subject to the problems of polysemy and synonymy. Conversely, Conway 
and McInerney (2008) noted that video sharing and social media might facilitate the 
acceptance of violence with regards to those who have already chosen a stance and 
actively seek the material. It may also target vulnerable youth who have no prior 
interest in the ideology or politics.  
 
6.7.3 Recruitment  
The Islamic State’s propaganda is no less effective in South Africa than in other parts 
of the world, and has already turned the heads of dozens of young South African 
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Muslims who have gone to join the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria (Opperman, 2016b). 
According to Ranstorp (2005) there are three main areas, which have been identified 
that assist with the path to radicalism. Firstly, the radical mosque environment and 
study groups; secondly, prisons are viewed as centres for radicalisation; and lastly the 
Internet. According to Veldhuis and Staun (2009) recruitment is determined by social 
and individual dynamics, including identity, social networks and personal 
motivations. They assume that an individual who is attractive to top-down recruiters 
has shown interest in the ideology or at least susceptibility. With this understanding, 
recruitment is viewed as a process that overlaps with the already occurring process of 
radicalisation – recruitment therefore accelerates the radicalisation process, it does not 
initiate it. 
Bokhari, Hegghammer, Lia, Nesser and Tønnessen (2006, p.10) are in agreement with 
Veldhuis and Staun (2009) by noting, “there is no or little organisational push from 
above in the recruitment process. Rather, the push, comes from below, in the sense 
that sympathizers of the global jihad actively approach militant milieus and want to 
join”. They argue further, that the decisive factors that drive an individual towards 
Islamism are social bonds and networks. It is most important that a link is made to the 
Islamist narrative/organisation via friends, family or people that the individual trusts 
as seen in all the cases. Individuals are also more likely to join an organisation or 
movement in groups rather than alone. 
Tables 1-4 are representative of the factors found within the Root Cause Model 
(Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) and the progress along the Staircase to Terrorism Model 
(Moghaddam, 2005) applicable to the respective case studies. On inspection of the 
tables, one will notice that the factors leading to the radicalisation of each individual 
are different. They do share similarities with regards to macro and macro social 
factors, namely: globalisation and modernisation, relative deprivation, collective 
emotions, self-categorisation and social identity, as well as social interaction and 
group processes.  This sheds light on the importance of group dynamics and identity 
with regards to radicalisation. 
6.7.4 Globalisation and Modernisation 
Globalisation is an international system with its own laws and logic, which have the 
ability to influence the environment, politics and economy of a country. In addition, 
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globalisation has its own technology – the Internet, optic fibre, computerisation, 
digitalisation, miniaturisation and satellite technology. The defining feature of 
globalisation is speed – in other words, the speed of communication, innovation, 
travel and commerce (Stibli, 2010). Globalisation is not only advantageous for the 
business orientated. It is a system that allows for the emergence and spread of 
transnational ideologies, which are used to gain followers and encourage collective or 
single action.  
According to Wictorowicz (2001) the Salafi movement is the fasting growing Islamic 
movement, heavily influencing Islamic practice and ideological orientations of 
Muslims all over the world. “Such extensive diffusion of radical interpretations of 
Islam is a by-product of globalisation and symbolises the rapid expansion of 
transnational, virtual networks that serve as platforms for transnational opinion 
formation and recruitment into radical movements” (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).   
Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures—
both bleak, neither democratic. The first is a retribalisation of large swaths of 
humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened Lebanonisation of national 
states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe 
against tribe—a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths 
against every kind of interdependence, every kind of artificial social 
cooperation and civic mutuality. The second is being borne in on us by the 
onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and 
uniformity and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and 
fast food—with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one 
commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by 
technology, ecology, communications, and commerce. The planet is falling 
precipitately apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same moment 
(Barber, 1992).  
According to Barber (1995, as cited in Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) as a result of this 
“McWorld” (1992, 1995) Muslims everywhere in the world are faced with 
consumerism, liberation and modern technology. Economic deprivation increases for 
the lower class as a result of globalisation. Furthermore, Muslims are confronted with 
values, images and an ethos that is in contrast to Islamic culture. According to Pipes 
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(2000) the Islamist ideology rejects all influences of the West. There is no way for 
Islam to co-exist with the West’s idea of modernisation. Rather it is perceived that 
westernisation is an attempt to gain control over the Islamic world (Barber 1995, as 
cited in Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). 
6.7.5 Relative Deprivation 
Precht (2007) asserts that relative deprivation encompasses factors such as poverty, 
discrimination, alienation and social dissatisfaction. When this is take into account, 
Islamism may be seen as a chance to attain dignity or respect. The concept of relative 
deprivation is used, rather than absolute deprivation because the former refers to one’s 
subjective perception of deprivation in contrast to one’s chosen reference groups, an 
abstract ideal or even an ideal espoused by a leader. Furthermore individuals may act 
on behalf of others; they need not be personally deprived – such as the case with AC 
and the Thulsie twins. Relative deprivation may then be described as incongruity 
between what individuals believe they are righty entitled to, and what they are 
actually able to obtain. Individuals may feel deprived regardless of whether their basic 
needs are met; furthermore being in abject poverty does not necessarily result in 
feelings of deprivation (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).  
Feelings of relative deprivation may cause frustration and despair, though it does not 
always lead to radicalisation, as a frustration-aggression hypothesis would suggest. It 
may lead to individuals withdrawing, becoming depressed or finding a means of 
escape, this is because most people who live in poorer areas or are not financially 
stable do not become terrorists (Moghaddam, 2005; Precht, 2007).   
6.7.6 Collective Emotions 
Intergroup emotions theory (IET) aims to comprehend and mend intergroup relations 
by looking at the emotions that are inherent in belonging to a particular social group, 
from which one derives an identity. All of the aforementioned cases shared this factor. 
Intergroup emotions are shaped by the ways in which members of different groups 
view events and objects relevant to them. Those emotions become part of the group 
membership through repetition. These emotions regulate certain intergroup 
behaviours (Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008). “It is the anger, anxiety, pride, and guilt 
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that other groups evoke in our own that drive our social, political, and physical 
responses to them, and it is only by changing such emotions that intergroup behaviour 
can change” (Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008, p.1867). 
IET posits that individuals have different emotions depending on the way the feel as 
individuals versus the group they belong to, and identify with. In the cases above, the 
Muslim identity has taken precedence over the South African or British identity – as 
AC stated he “[is a] Muslims first and Muslim last. Passports are no more than travel 
documents” (Kern, 2015). Individuals can belong to multiple groups – one can be a 
Muslim and a South African, and feel differently about each one. There may be some 
overlap but one can be content and proud of themselves and their achievements as an 
individual, but not a proud South African, for example. When people start to see 
themselves as part of a group, they also begin to view themselves as sharing 
characteristics typical of the group. Furthermore, this leads them to feel general 
emotions and reactions typical to the group, with soccer fans for example, being a fan 
of Manchester United is to refute Liverpool (Hogg, 1995; Mackie, Smith & Ray, 
2008, Al Raffie, 2013). The consequences of this behaviour are that individuals can 
feel anger on behalf of the group they identify with and this anger involves the same 
arousal as if one was personally insulted. MSK and the Thulsie twins for example, felt 
very strongly about how Muslims were being treated all over the world – “Your 
democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my 
people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, 
just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and 
sisters” (Mohammed Sidique Khan, 2005; BBC News, 2005a).   
This anger will dissipate should the angered individual direct the ill feelings to 
another source. The most important aspect of intergroup emotions is that it has the 
ability to affect judgment and behaviour. Particular emotions are associated with 
certain behaviours – for example the feeling of anger invokes the intention to act 
against the source of anger. Intergroup emotions need not be negative alone - 
sometimes feeling guilt as a group allows members to act kindly to the affected out-
group. Intergroup emotions can be viewed as integral to adaptive functioning as a 
group, such that it regulates actions within the context of significant group 
memberships (Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008). 
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Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus and Gordjin (2003) conducted a study on the impact of 
social identification and categorisation on emotional reactions and behavioural 
tendencies. Their study showed that individuals identify with the victims of harmful 
behaviour – seeing themselves as part of the same group. The emotional experience 
that is felt has an impact on one’s tendency to act, for example, anger may not only 
cause an offensive action but also one of avoidance. Actions are not to be confused 
with an individual’s actual behaviour.  
It is the emotions evoked by human beings’ social identities that explain why people 
fight and what they die for (Mackie, Smith & Ray, 2008, p.1877). 
6.7.8 Social Interactions and Group Processes 
Individuals are part of a system of interactions that will ultimately shape their attitude 
and behaviour. How one feels, believes and behaves is greatly influenced by the 
people they interact with. Social networks, when examined, give insight into how 
ideologies can spread, how radical communities are formed, and how certain 
individuals become involved in these groups and violent behaviour. On closer 
inspection, one may discover the hierarchal structure of the network (Veldhuis & 
Staun, 2009).  
Zierhoffer (2014) echoes the sentiment of Wiktorowicz (2004) by noting that the 
typical terrorist makes contact with others who share similar interests. This is how 
MSK and AC started their journey towards radicalism. MSK often socialized with 
Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain – the two other 7/7 bombers (BBC News, 2007). 
When AC met Omar Bakri Mohammed that sparked his interest in Sharia law, 
furthermore this encounter is responsible for his understanding of Islam. MJ, Omar 
Hartley and Sedich Achmat, apart from being related, also have shared interests and 
understandings. Furthermore, the Thulsie twins discovered Sheikh Musa Jibril and his 
online community which shaped their understanding of Islam. It is imperative to 
acknowledge that individuals adopt the attitudes and behaviours of those around them 
(Milgram, 1963). 
 As mentioned previously “frame alignment” is important when attempting to attract 
supporters or future members. The movement or ideology must resound with an 
individual’s personal framework in order to enable participation. “Alignment is 
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contingent upon fidelity with cultural narratives, symbols, and identities; the 
reputation of the frame “articulator”; the consistency of the frame; the frame’s 
empirical credibility; and the personal salience of the frame for potential participants” 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.5). In other words, an individual will be more likely to join if 
the ideological representation of the group fits the interests of the potential member.  
Behaviour on a whole is strongly affected by the social context in which it occurs – 
for example; the presence of an authority figure can have great bearing on the 
decisions individuals make (Milgram, 1963). Similarly in the Asch (1951) conformity 
experiment (studies showing if and how individuals yield or defy a majority group 
contrary to known fact) some individuals would conform to the majority despite the 
fact that they did not believe in or subscribe to the behaviour or attitude. One of the 
factors that determine yielding and independence is the character of the individual. It 
was proposed that it is functionally dependent on enduring character differences; 
particularly those related to an individuals social interaction, such as confidence, for 
example (Asch, 1951).  
Whilst studying at college in the UK, I met others who showed me how I 
could channel that desire and help through my religion. And I was radicalized 
enough to consider violence correct even virtue under certain circumstances. 
So I become involved in the Jihad in Afghanistan, I wanted to protect the 
Muslim Afghan population against the Soviet army. And I thought that, that 
was Jihad – my sacred duty which would be rewarded by God. I became a 
preacher. I was one of the pioneers of violent Jihad in the UK. I recruited, I 
raised funds, I trained. I confused true Jihad with this perversion as presented 
by the fascist Islamists (Ali, 2016). 
Through social mechanisms like homophile (the tendency for individuals to gravitate 
towards and bond with those who are similar to them) and social influence, it is rather 
easy to develop and spread radical ideology. In the same way, however, these 
mechanisms have the potential to hinder the spread of violent ideology.  Social 
networks can be a source of support and positive information (Veldhuis & Staun, 
2009). As stated earlier majorities have the ability to influence others (Asch, 1951) 
but the same applies to leaders and charismatic individuals (Milgram, 1963). 
Positively orientated leaders and peers have the ability to prevent radicalisation, as 
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well promote social bonding, health and integration (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).  
Individual characteristics cannot be fully examined with the use of a case study 
because it is not possible to know every experience or thought of an individual. The 
following individual factors/characteristics may be said to have a universal 
application. 
6.8 Causal Factors at the Micro Level: Individual Characteristics  
6.8.1 Personal Characteristics  
 
There is a tendency to label a terrorist as “crazy” or assume they must be suffering 
from some type of mental illness. The truth is however, healthy, well adjusted and 
social individuals are also open to radicalisation and terrorism. Personality traits or 
environmental conditions are relevant contributing factors to terrorism but there is no 
single cause (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). Currently there is no socio-demographic 
or personality profile of radical groups and their members. This is largely due to the 
heterogeneous personality profiles of known terrorists and the complex nature of 
radicalisation (Victoroff, 2005; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Post, 2010; Phillips, 
2011; McCauley,	Moskalenko,	&	Van	Son, 2013). 
Generally, radical groups have many diverse personality and cognitive profiles within 
their ranks. Individuals who are suffering from severe mental illness often have 
difficulty fitting into groups – this is true whether it be a corporate group or terror 
group. There are exceptions however and these typically seem to be lone wolf 
terrorists (Spitaletta, 2013). Hussain and Saltman (2014) assert that mental illness 
seems to be particularly common amongst lone wolf perpetrators. Spaaij’s (2010) 
research findings support the aforementioned statement. The lone wolf’s mental 
illness manifests and/or intensifies in the lead up to the attack (ranging from delusions 
and obsessive fantasies to severe schizophrenia). It is therefore important to consider 
whether the attacks are based in extremist ideology or if these are troubled individuals 
who are trying to justify their feelings of isolation. In the study conducted by Gill, 
Horgan and Deckert (2014), a little under a third (31.9%) of their sample had suffered 
from mental illness or a personality disorder. For the majority of these individuals the 
diagnosis came before their acts of terror. For example, Naveed Afzal Haq had been 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and Ted Kaczynski was found to be a paranoid 
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schizophrenic.   
Spitaletta (2013) notes a dispositional characteristic that may place one at risk of 
radicalisation – intolerance of uncertainty. This is a cognitive bias that affects the way 
an individual responds to uncertain situations physically and psychologically. This is 
associated with anxiety, leading to perceptions of certain situations as stressful and 
having a subjective sense of unfairness. While intolerance of uncertainty is a risk 
factor for anxiety, there is no evidence to support it as a risk factor for radicalisation. 
When looking at the propensity of specific personality types to engage in terrorist 
behaviour, the authoritarian personality (rooted in personal conflict and childhood 
experience) is submissive to authority and takes orders well. Individuals with this 
personality type desire stability and can become anxious and insecure under 
conditions, which are not in line with the worldview. Interestingly, in Milgram’s 
experiment (1963; 1974 as cited in Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) individuals who scored 
high on the F-scale (Fascism questionnaire designed to identify authoritarian 
personalities) were more obedient to the authority figures and administered stronger 
electric shocks. This relationship should not be overemphasized – other participants 
who did not score high on the F-scale also acknowledged and obeyed the 
experimenter. Further attempts to relate narcissism to terrorism proved infertile. There 
is no research that can provide a personality profile of a potential radical – they seem 
to be in no way extraordinary or different to general populace (Veldhuis & Staun, 
2009). 
6.8.2 Personal Experiences 
The decisions that people make are often a result of their personal experience with 
others and their world (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). There are some researchers who 
argue that vulnerability to radicalisation and subsequently terrorism are the result of 
an abusive childhood. De Mause (2004) asserts that the developmental life history of 
terrorists can give insight into why they perceive terrorism as an option. He asserts, 
“children who grow up to be Islamic terrorists are products of a misogynist 
fundamentalist system” (p.194). The system he refers to is one of segregation – a 
separating of men from women – where a child grows up in an environment wherein 
the father is rarely present. According to De Mause (2004) countries that are fiercely 
misogynistic produce the most terrorists. He emphasizes the abuse and ill treatment of 
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girls who are raised in fundamentalist families, drawing the conclusion that those girls 
will grow to make “less than ideal” (p.195) mothers by inflicting their pain upon their 
children with a very punitive upbringing. This upbringing, he argues, results in the 
need for their parents’ approval. The West and all it stands for is the embodiment of 
the “bad boy” that would lose the approval of their mothers – they are taught to deny 
themselves personal pleasures and freedoms. Accordingly, these children have a rage 
that can only be placated by being inflicted on others (De Mause, 2004). 
Broekhuis (2016) posits that personal experiences could be the reason for an 
individual to become radicalized, as after experiencing a negative life-event they are 
more vulnerable to religious/extremist ideology. Unfavourable life events are often 
seen as the precursor to violent behaviour. A distinction must be made however 
between normal life events, such as moving to a new home or school (which can be 
disruptive) as opposed to being attacked or discriminated against - “anger can lead to 
contempt, and thus to legitimisation of non-normative actions” (Broekhuis, 2016, 
p.7). According to Baumeister, Twenge and Nuss (2002) an experience of 
discrimination or exclusion can cause anger and aggression. The assumption of their 
study is that individuals place great value upon stable, lasting relationships, as the 
need to belong is an essential human trait. Rejection and discrimination threaten one’s 
self-esteem and de-creases positive social behaviour. According to Moss (2011) self-
esteem facilitates a sense of meaning. Sometimes vulnerability to radicalisation is 
fuelled by the quest for significance or personal meaning as a result of lost 
significance due to a traumatic experience or frustrations. This may lead to 
individuals turning to ideologies that offer a way to restore significance (Kruglanski, 
Chen, Dechesne, Fishman & Orehek, 2009). Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) posit 
that a subsequent act of terror or suicide bombing, is the result of an awareness of our 
mortality, the fear of living a trivial existence without making any noteworthy 
contributions to others, or not being remembered motivates one to be a “good” 
member of society. The ultimate “good” would be a self-sacrificing act for others. By 
putting the group first, one becomes highly valued and recognised as the hero or 
martyr in the groups’ collective memory. A suicidal act of terror therefore is quite 
ironical as it is driven by the desire to live forever. 
6.8.3 Cognitions 
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Lloyd (as cited in Hamm, 2009) suggests that there may be a generic psychology to 
extremism on an emotional level that allows individuals to blame an out-group who is 
deemed less worthy. Commonalities range from personality disorders, depression and 
suicidal tendencies. Rigid thinking and polarizing of ideas and others is also common 
– individuals have a black and white understanding of the world. Significant life 
events, trauma and victimisation are also found (geographical displacement, loss and 
death of family members and poor parenting, for example). Depression, low self-
esteem, a longing for identity and a need to belong as well as a sense of injustice may 
be present. Conversely many researchers (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Post, 2010; 
Phillips, 2011; McCauley,	Moskalenko,	&	Van	Son, 2013) affirm that there has been 
no firm evidence with respects to a relationship between mental illness and 
radicalisation or terrorism.  
Victoroff (2012) asserts that the risk of radicalisation and subsequent terrorism is 
almost always determined by a combination of innate factors; including biology, early 
development and cognitive factors, as well as temperament, environmental influences 
and group dynamics. According to him, any theory that claims the dominance of one 
of these factors over the others is premature. Furthermore, these individuals are 
psychologically heterogeneous. “Whatever his stated goals and group of identity, 
every terrorist, like every person, is motivated by his own complex of psychosocial 
experiences and trait” (Victoroff, 2012, p.35). According to Spitaletta (2013) 
psychopathology is rarely the determining factor in the conversion from law-abiding 
citizen to violent offender. It should be viewed as a combination of some underlying 
psychopathology (major or minor) and specific environmental conditions, which push 
the individual towards radical behaviour. 
6.8.4 Emotions 
As mentioned previously, individuals do not need to be directly affected by 
circumstances to feel emotionally moved or involved (Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009; 
McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Al Raffie, 2013). According to Davies (2009, p.190) 
“Individuals are driven by a combination of certain experiences (trauma or 
humiliation, fear of outside groups, alienation, frustration, globalisation) and 
psychological predispositions (the need for cognitive closure, respect for authority, 
the need for uniqueness)”. Shame, honour and insult are issues that require 
	 103	
investigation. There has been great controversy, for example, with regards to the 
cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed which appeared in Jyllands Posten, the backlash of 
The Satanic Verses and the Charlie Hebdo shooting. Staun (2008) asserts that 
emotional experiences contribute to radicalisation, for example feelings of shame, 
guilt and the desire for revenge contribute to occurrences of suicide terrorism. In his 
Fatwa, Osama Bin Laden stated: 
The walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain 
of bullets. The freeman does not surrender leadership to infidels and sinners. 
Without shedding blood no degradation and branding can be removed from 
the forehead… Death is better than life in humiliation! Some scandals and 
shames will never be otherwise eradicated (Osama Bin Laden, 1996; PBS 
News Desk, 1996).  
If one assumes that individuals who feel humiliated will search for (sometimes 
violent) ways to restore their dignity, one should be aware of the role of humiliation 
and similar emotional experiences with regards to the study of terrorism (Staun, 
2008).  
Raine (2015) posits that there should be no polarisation between emotion and reason, 
as very often, emotion is one of the most important aspects of rational thought – 
reason does not require emotion however all social actions have some aspect of 
emotional input. Emotions can be private, occurring within an individual or 
sometimes a collective phenomenon that can be found, for example, in areas of 
conflict. Collective emotions are significant in politics and religion.  
According to Haider (2015) the actions of a radial minority create the conditions for 
widespread negative sentiment and discrimination toward a moderate non-offending 
majority thereby facilitating radicalisation and feelings of alienation. Schmid (2013, 
p.2) states that “a culture of alienation and humiliation can act as a kind of growth 
medium in which the process of radicalisation commences and virulent extremism 
comes to thrive”.  Humiliation, according to Linder (2001, as cited in Raine, 2015) is 
a social process that needs to be understood as it may give insight into the social order 
of a society. By acknowledging and trying to understand the emotion behind an 
action, one can provide a more holistic review of the problem.  The roots of terror can 
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be found in political discontent whereby the desire for revenge against repression may 
be motivation enough. “The complexities of social action are better understood when 
one recognises that actions (both in their material presentations and symbolic 
representations) are infused with emotion” (Raine, 2015, p.5).  
6.9 Conclusion 
In summation, issues such as alienation, discrimination and social exclusion bolster 
the radicalisation process. Individuals look towards religion to inform their identity 
and give them a sense of purpose or meaning. The Internet is a product of 
globalisation, which has had a major role in the process of radicalisation, and the 
dissemination of information. Furthermore prisons, universities and schools are 
environments that have the potential to foster radicalisation. Foreign policy 
grievances related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, are the used as 
the driving force for recruitment.  Incidents such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting show 
the power of human emotion and what can come of provocation. The presence of a 
charismatic individual or leader should also be acknowledged as they help many 
down the path of radicalisation.  
At the individual level there are many factors that could accelerate the process of 
radicalisation. All individuals have different coping mechanisms and strategies for 
major life events and this may have a great impact on an individual who has the 
potential to radicalise. Furthermore, the interpretation of social phenomenon and 
interpersonal interaction is based on one’s individual perception of reality. Individuals 
may view the same article or speech in a very different way – some may see it as 
provocation, while others are able to ignore it. Events at this level that could catapult 
an individual into radicalisation are varied at this level and depend greatly on the 
world-view of the individual. Social factors and group dynamics have a great effect 
on one’s susceptibility to radicalisation. Macro-level conditions may lay the 
foundation for grievances or feelings of injustice, but one must account for the social 
and individual characteristics, which combine, in a unique fashion to allow for 
radicalisation.  




























Discussion and Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the research questions, the implications 
of the findings and the limitations of the study.  
7.2 Discussion 
What is radicalisation? 
Radicalisation may be understood in two ways. Firstly, it may be viewed as an 
individual holding radical ideas and beliefs about society or government (cognitive). 
Secondly, it may be viewed as behavioural, whereby violence is accepted and used as 
a solution. It is important to acknowledge these as separate because not all radicalized 
individuals are terrorists – however all terrorists have been through a process of 
radicalisation. What is understood as radical is also dependent upon what is normal, 
and cognitive radicalisation can turn into behavioural radicalisation. 
 
Essentially radicalisation is a learned process that involves a change in the way one 
thinks, feels, the way they view the world and how they orientate themselves in it. It 
is a change facilitated by elements such as the need to belong, identity and group 
dynamics. 
 
I went through this process and I think it is essentially a process that involves 
an individual feeling a sense of grievance, whether real or perceived, and 
thereby leading to an identity crisis about whether one is, in my case, British 
or Pakistani or both or Muslim. Those grievances and that identity crisis are 
capitalised upon by a recruiter, usually a charismatic recruiter. Finally, that 
recruiter sells to the vulnerable young individual, who in most cases is 
educated … an ideology and a narrative, a world view (Nawaz, as cited in 
House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, 2012, p.11).  
This paper could have focused on the radicalisation of any religion, however, Islam 
was chosen because the fear and nature of Islamism (an ideology based on a life based 
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on Sharia Law and the establishment of a Caliphate) is rampant.  There are many 
paths towards radicalism, and many different phase models, which illustrate the 
various stages involved. Although these models differ, there are two ideas that are 
generally accepted. Firstly, radicalisation is a process. One does not become radical 
overnight. Secondly, there is no universal profile for a radicalized individual; there 
are many factors and reasons that result in the radicalisation of an individual, all of 
which are particular to that individual in their specific combination. This was 
illustrated through the case studies. Although all the cases shared issues with identity, 
relative deprivation, resentment of Western powers, the use of the Internet (indicative 
of globalisation) and revealed the complexities of social/group dynamics, each 
individual was raised under different circumstances and their life experiences were 
not the same, nor could one attribute the few instances they share to be the sole cause 
of radicalisation.  
What are the psychological processes involved in radicalisation? 
The process of radicalisation is psychologically and emotionally orientated. 
Individuals who have suffered significant trauma, have difficulties surrounding 
identity and the need to belong, experiences of discrimination and alienation all play a 
part in the radicalisation process. One of the psychological processes involved in 
radicalisation is Terror Management. This involves the need to maintain one’s 
worldview in order to reduce feelings of anxiety, specifically about existence and the 
fear of death. When others challenge or endanger this worldview, this may cause 
discomfort or provoke anxiety. An example of this may be an individual questioning 
or poking holes in a firmly held belief. Another example may be someone pointing 
out inconsistencies or illogical aspects of one’s beliefs, thereby triggering anxiety and 
the need to defend one’s position. Another aspect one has to take into account is 
displacement, more specifically the displacement of aggression. Individuals who are 
unhappy with their situation may try to find a person, race, country or organisation to 
blame, justly or unjustly, for their predicament. In the case studies, all four individuals 
place blame upon Western governments, particularly the United States. 
Another psychological aspect involved in radicalisation is moral disengagement 
(Bandura, 1999; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). This is essentially reconstructing 
inappropriate behaviour or inhumane ideologies as legitimate through the use of 
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language, displacement, and the diffusion of responsibility, disregarding the victims 
and effects of violence. AC provides an example of this behaviour when he insinuated 
that the Charlie Hebdo attacks were the result of unnecessary provocation. He 
rationalizes the attack by justifying it as being something that should be expected and 
accepted as a means of retaliatory justice (Nianias, 2015). 
This process enables individuals to distance themselves from people they do not 
consider to be part of their in-group (Bandura, 1999; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). 
The process of identifying one’s ‘group’ or place in society forms the basis of Social 
Identity Theory (Hogg, 1995; Stets & Burke 2000; Al Raffie, 2013), quite possibly 
the most important psychological aspect involved in radicalisation. This process 
involves finding a group that one identifies with, whereby bonds are formed over 
cultural, religious, familial, and ethnic lines or sometimes over leisure activities or 
hobbies. The groups that one identifies and affiliates with (in-group) are 
representative of social networks and communities and are not geographically limited; 
for example, one may identify as Muslim and feel a strong bond with other Muslims 
around the world – which all four individuals shared. One can have more than one 
identity – for example, one may be a South African Muslim who is a professional 
soccer player. With regards to the case studies, all four individuals seem to have 
placed their Muslim identity above their national identities quite possibly jeopardizing 
their loyalty to the latter. 
 
Having an out-group is not necessarily a negative thing, the process of identifying the 
group one fits into and those one does not are a natural and unavoidable means of 
categorisation. The product of this type of social categorisation is an increase in self-
esteem and a subsequent increase in the perceived differences between one’s in-group 
and one’s out-group. The identities one holds are not only descriptive; they are 
prescriptive, which can be quite dangerous. If one finds belonging and acceptance in a 
radical group, for example, being a member may not just involve having the same 
grievance or dislike. Part of being in that group, and being accepted, may involve 
accepting and spreading hatred, or even inciting or committing an act of violence. 
MSK, for example, believed it was his duty to defend and avenge his fellow Muslims. 
He viewed himself as a soldier (Mohammed Sidique Khan, 2005; BBC News, 2005a) 




What makes an individual vulnerable to radicalisation? 
 
Younger people seem to be more at risk of radicalisation (Slootman & Tillie, 2006; 
Roy, 2008; Lynch, 2013; Coolsaet, 2015), more specifically individuals in their teens 
to late-twenties, evidenced by MSK, AC and the Thulsie twins. This is probably 
because being accepted is more important to younger people as they are still coming 
to terms with who they are, and want to avoid feelings of discrimination or isolation. 
Furthermore, radical groups are representative of a counter-cultural group that may be 
attractive to younger, more impressionable individuals who feel the need to be 
different, rebellious or relevant. 
 
With regards to second and third generation immigrant families one is confronted 
with difficulties in forming a cohesive identity that incorporates one’s faith and 
national identity – for example, being British and being Muslim. There may be 
difficulty in trying to balance these two identities, because leaning towards, or 
favouring one part may result in alienation in the other. The fear of, or feelings of 
alienation may lead individuals down the path of radicalism because they are looking 
for acceptance, understanding, meaning or a greater purpose – which radical groups 
offer in abundance coupled with camaraderie, infamy and glory. 
 
When looking towards converts/ previously non-Muslim youth who join Islamist 
groups one may see a vague understanding or superficial knowledge of the religion, 
which is evidence by the Thulsie twins. Their understanding of Islam was formed 
online through Sheik Ahmed Musa Jibril known for his orientation towards Islamism. 
Very often these individuals, like the Thulsie twins, are looking for a way to become 
relevant. They want to find meaning or purpose in their lives and do something 
worthwhile or heroic. Radical Islam is dangerous and pervasive because it is not only 
Muslims who are drawn to it. Individuals of every nationality, creed and colour are 
drawn to the ideas of these radical groups. This is precisely what makes radical 
groups successful – they prey on lonely, alienated, impressionable individuals who 
are found all over the world.  
 
There are undoubtedly those who relish the thought of modern warfare and 
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dominating others through fear mongering. And mental illness is rarely cited as a 
cause for radicalisation or acts of terror. This is probably what makes it so difficult to 
understand as those affected are comparatively normal, experience a range of factors 
found in relatively every individuals life – yet only a few become radicalized. There 
may be one event in a string of facilitating factors that triggers one’s path to 
radicalism; it may be a charismatic preacher, the loss of a parent or a headline in the 
news, whatever it may be, it starts the process of radicalisation for some individuals 
and not others. Those particularly vulnerable may be those who have issues with 
identity, suffer from relative deprivation, and harbour resentment towards Western 
powers as well as those who are victim to the complexities of social/group dynamics. 
The challenge may not be finding out what makes someone vulnerable to 
radicalisation, but finding what makes someone resilient and what factors keep him or 
her away and disinterested in radical group membership – both of these approaches 
are however multifaceted and inherently complicated.  
 
What are the causal factors that could contribute to radicalisation among 
Muslims in South Africa? 
 
When considering South Africa’s vulnerability to radicalisation, one cannot say there 
is no risk. Radical Islamist groups prey on very common human desires – to feel 
understood, to belong and feel as though you are important in some way. The South 
African population is not devoid of these universal longings – as clearly shown by the 
Thulsie twins. South African Muslims have integrated well into South African 
society, and as a whole the country seems to have a good grasp on tolerance and 
acceptance with regards to diversity. There have been incidences of discrimination, or 
instances of radical speech, however this happens all over the world. The cases of MJ 
and AC raise questions about free speech. Believing in a radical ideology does not 
make one a terrorist – neither does sharing those opinions with others. Radical views 
and opinions of a few do not represent the sentiments of an entire population, 
however the difficulty lies in accommodating extremist views in a plural society. To 
address the problems of radicalisation one could aim to silence and ban organisations 
like Islam4UK, preventing membership and demonstrations. If this is the route taken, 
one runs the risk of infringing upon the rights of free speech and essentially going 
against democracy. The real obstacle is whether free speech comes with a 
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responsibility or a line of appropriateness – if this is the case, the problem is now 
about who draws that line. Furthermore, one can expect everyone to not have the 
same ideas and not get along completely – with the right to say what you want and 
question anything; one is bound to offend someone. Offending someone should not be 
the concern however, as Chris Moos said “Offence is taken, not created. Just to say 
that some people might be offended – [is] not an argument [for] people [to] demand 
that you not exercise your basic right" (Bland, 2014). Modood, Hansen, Bleich, 
O’Leary, and Carens (2006) assert that being part of a liberal democratic society 
means that one will be offended at times, and one has the right to ignore that offense 
or protest peacefully. One does not have the right to demand criminal sanction or 
react with violence. The part of the democratic framework that allows individuals to 
freely practice their religion and culture is the same framework that protects freedom 
of speech, which is not a negotiable addition.  
When one considers the dangers inherent in allowing for the open support of, and 
invitation to join proscribed organisations like ISIS, perhaps the limit to ‘free speech’ 
is reached as this becomes the incitement of violence and may at times, border on 
treason. As mentioned earlier AC was arrested under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 
2000, which covers individuals who support proscribed organisations, with support 
not being restricted to finance or property. South Africa’s Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004, Part 2, section 4, 
covers the “threat, attempt, conspiracy and [inducement of] another person to commit 
an offence”.   Part 1, section 3 of the same act covers “Offences associated or 
connected with terrorist activities” covers soliciting or supporting of an organisation 
which one “ought reasonably to have known or suspected that such weapons, 
soliciting, training, recruitment, document or thing is so connected, is guilty of an 
offence connected with terrorist activities”. 
 
South Africa has been fortunate enough to not have similar experiences to that of 
France, the United States and the UK, which has resulted in intolerance, 
discrimination and fear – which form the fuel for radicalisation. The identity of South 
African Muslims, in terms of how one feels about one’s group, like all other 
identities, is subject to fluctuation in terms of how a particular part of that identity is 
viewed by others. As stated previously, group identity has no geographical limit, the 
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attitudes towards, and suffering endured by Muslims around the world may have 
some bearing on the way South African Muslims feel about the world and their place 
in it – one may constantly have to defend one’s faith, whether they openly question or 
not. The Thulsie twins, for example, were new to the religion of Islam, though their 
identity was strongly linked to that of Muslims around the world – they felt that their 
suffering was unacceptable. This is an example of how emotion and identity work 
together – the suffering of Muslims around the world is comparable to one feeling 
personally insulted by those actions. 
 
The Internet is a risk that should be considered by every country. It plays a crucial 
role in the lives of countless individuals worldwide. As reliance and usage of the 
Internet increases, it may be natural to assume the increase of extremists using the 
Internet to spread their message. The Internet allows individuals to access anything at 
anytime from anywhere in the world on multiple devices. As MJ stated:  
When I visited these Jihadi sites, I downloaded everything. This information 
that I downloaded, is information that everyone has access to and is freely 
available. They are legal to download. The pictures downloaded reveal how 
Muslims throughout the world are being killed and how they are killing those 
who are attacking them (Solomon, 2013). 
He was not incorrect by saying it was his right to view and watch the information that 
was freely available to anyone, should they choose to watch it. The products/ 
chemicals that were seized could easily be written off as household products – pool 
cleaner (hydrochloric acid), paint cleaner (acetone) and bleach (peroxide). With the 
views he shares one could understand the reason for concern. It seems that one does 
not stumble upon radical material online – the Internet is aiding an already established 
path towards radicalism. One can find an abundance of information that is true and 
verified on the Internet, but there is equally false, exaggerated or manipulative 
information. Sheik Ahmed Musa Jibril for example, is a radical preacher who has 
managed to inspire many individuals like the Thulsie twin, which some would argue 
is a false interpretation and teaching of Islam. One has to acknowledge the risk of 
online recruitment into terrorist organisations, as well as the threat of the lone wolf – 
which many have said South Africa is vulnerable to. These individuals may have no 
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affiliation with an organisation however they do have a personal motive or 
inspiration. Terrorist groups have learned how to appeal to potential lone wolves, to 
attract and seduce them, to train and teach them and ultimately to launch them on 
their attacks – all via online communication, through platforms such as chat rooms, 
Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. The Internet seems to function as a surrogate 
command and control network. It may be that opinions and support they encounter via 
the Internet is able to push them towards carrying out actual terrorist activity. If the 
processes of recruiting, supporting and training lone wolves are dependent (even 
partly) on online platforms these sites should be monitored and studied to gain further 
insight into the lone wolf’s psychology and motivation. Furthermore researchers need 
to identify weaknesses in extremist ideology and exploit them; take control of the 
monopoly that extremists hold over certain topics. 
There is not enough information available to confirm the severity of risk with regards 
to prison radicalisation. What is known is that Islam is the fastest growing religion in 
South African prisons – this is not necessarily a bad thing. Religion definitely has its 
place in the correctional services environment, providing prisoners with a means of 
spiritual and psychological healing. The concern would lie in who is teaching the 
religion, and what version of Islam they are receiving. As previously stated, 
frustration or disenchantment is not enough to lead a person into adopting radical 
ideologies. Contact with others who advocate radical ideologies is sometimes needed, 
although individuals are able to self-radicalize (as is the case with lone wolves). The 
risk in prison may be elevated due to many dissatisfied, and possibly angry 
individuals being in one space, allowing for daily contact. The UK will attempt to 
implement new housing arrangements for radicals to reduce their contact with other 
prisoners.  South Africa does not have the need to adopt this approach, however if the 
need should arise they may take the lead from UK.  
South Africa’s vulnerability to a terrorist attack may partly be due to their lack of 
acknowledgement of a problem. The main question of this paper however deals with 
South Africa’s vulnerability to radicalisation. It may be said that South Africa is 
vulnerable to radicalisation just like any other country, because these radical 
organisations target very human vulnerabilities – the need to belong, to solidify one’s 
identity, to have purpose and meaning, and to feel like one matters in the grand 
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scheme of the world. Whether this radicalisation may result in an attack on South 
African, or foreign soil, it is definitely a phenomenon worth investigating and 
dedicating time to. One must also take into consideration South Africa’s poverty and 
rampant corruption, which could lead to feelings of relative deprivation. The known 
presence of training camps, as well as the verified reports of Al-Shabaab support in 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Roshneee, the constant recruitment efforts of ISIS in 
the cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth, and the Al-Qaeda-
aligned Jahbaht al-Nusra supporters in Port Elizabeth must be acknowledged 
(Opperman, 2016b). As stated earlier, South Africa’s involvement is generally about 
financial support and recruitment. However according to Opperman (2016b) there is 
an estimated 20 – 50 individuals, including families who have moved to Iraq and 
Syria in support of ISIS. The reason for their move is not one of resentment towards 
South Africa; rather it is a way to prove that they are good Muslims by responding to 
the call for jihad. This reason may change because of South Africa’s Middle East 
policy that prioritizes relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, who are taking action 
against ISIS. 
South Africa may not have an open problematic display of radical thought or 
recruitment efforts, like the UK does, however therein lies an opportunity for 
learning. South Africa definitely has legislation that is on par with that of the UK, 
however there are no counter-radicalisation programmes or efforts currently in place.  
In order to intercept radical groups and their ideology, South Africa needs to see what 
countries like the UK are doing about it (like the PREVENT Strategy, for example) 
and try to implement similar approaches tailored to the specific needs of the South 
African context.  
According to Solomon (2011, p.3) “political correctness, shaped by South Africa’s 
unique history, continues to characterize the perspective of many in the country’s 
political establishment and undermines the fight against the scourge of terrorism”. 
Remaining cautious about portraying the Muslim population in a bad light, or 
seeming to target a religion and its people, is a noble endeavour, however there needs 
to be a formal analysis of the threat South Africa faces with regards to radicalisation. 
It is not possible to point out exactly which societal group is vulnerable to 
radicalisation, and it would be unwise to try. The proportion of individuals exposed to 
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the commonly cited factors of radicalisation is many, although the proportion of 
people who become radicalized is small. It would be ill advised to apply crude 
statistics to a population, as it may be counter-productive resulting in discrimination 
against, and resentment from those who are falsely painted as potential terrorists.  
 
How do causal factors relate to each other and how do they contribute to 
radicalisation when combined? 
 
One’s vulnerability to radicalisation seems to rest heavily on micro-level factors, 
particularly issues around identity. Furthermore, the causal factors bolster each other 
– individuals who disapprove of their government’s policies and feel that it is corrupt 
and not serving the needs of its people may feel relatively deprived and frustrated. 
This frustration leads individuals to seek solutions and find others who share similar 
views, leading to group membership and the subsequent group dynamics. The people 
one identifies with, who one prioritizes, personal experience and social influences 
greatly affect one’s choice of interactions and the direction in which one chooses to 
seek answers or comfort. Due to these factors being so varied for each radicalised 
individual, one may look towards demographic characteristics like religious, cultural 
or indigenous background to form a risk portfolio. Assessment that relies on 
collective aspects such as the above may result in governmental bias and/ or social 
sanctions towards specific demographics. Instead of considering which groups are 
more vulnerable to radicalisation, one should address factors that may cause 
grievances or discontent such as a lack of political participation, restricted access to 
social and financial resources, corruption, poor border control, etcetera.  
 
Identity and social relationships are at the centre of radicalisation. In order to address 
vulnerabilities on this level, a simple start would be to acknowledge the threat 
formally and have an open discussion about what it means to be ‘radicalised’, to 
discuss why the ideology of these groups is problematic and to offer parents, teachers 
and friends advice on how to help those they think may be vulnerable. This discussion 
needs to be had without the fear of appearing bigoted, and without targeted the 
religion of Islam. An analysis or exploration into possible strategies for policies or de-
radicalisation programmes is beyond the scope of this study.   
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7.3 Implications of the Study 
This study offers suggestive evidence that radicalisation is a threat for South Africa. 
Future research into radicalisation, with a focus on compiling detailed background 
profiles (inclusive of characteristics and circumstances) of known terrorist would be 
beneficial – not to form a ‘universal profile’ but rather building an understanding of 
risk factors. 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
This study was focused on the radicalisation of Islam due to its topical nature and 
global concern, however due to the sensitive nature of this topic, the study relied on 
case studies. The data sources used may not have been entirely reliable due to 
journalistic bias.  
7.5 Conclusion 
There is a large body of information with regards to individuals who have followed a 
radical path- but there is little information on those who reject that radical path. It has 
been established that very few people progress to violent action. Rather than focusing 
solely on people who have adopted a radical ideology, it may be useful to look into 
those who have been exposed to it, and chosen otherwise. In other words, looking into 
the receptiveness to violent ideology. By looking into both kinds of people, 
comparing and contrasting them, one may gain more insight.  Furthermore, current 
knowledge about radicalisation and its processes are quite limited. Although there is 
an extensive amount of literature around the subject with regards to the causes and 
consequences, information about who these individuals are and why they commit to 
violent ideologies is absent. What makes this particularly difficult is that these 
individuals do not come from a specific age group; socio-economic group or cultural 
background and they also by and large do not have any psychological idiosyncrasies. 
Radicalisation is an individual process. The combinations of factors, which make an 
individual vulnerable to radicalisation, vary per person. Some factors may have a 
greater effect on some, for example some people may be struggling with finding their 
identity while others are not. Taking this into account – designing measures aimed at 
preventing radicalisation (based on ‘high risk’ groups) may alienate said group 
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further, increasing intergroup conflict. What can be noted is that individuals who are 
exposed to causal factors are more likely to undergo radicalisation – people who 
belong to politically and/or culturally marginalized groups, or those who are poorly 
integrated, for example. One may assume that the more causal factors one is expose 
to, the higher one’s vulnerability – an individual may have lost a loved one, going 
through a state of depression and is experiencing discrimination, may be considered 
more vulnerable than someone who feels relatively deprived.  Perhaps when looking 
into preventative measures, attention must be given to those who are affected by 
many causal factors. One important point is that individuals who see themselves as 
part of a minority group and feel persecuted are more likely to respond with 
aggression or negative attitudes which may eventually lead them down the path of 
radicalisation. Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) propose that the overall social situation 
may have some influence over one’s path towards radicalisation. When exploring 
factors such as socioeconomic status, age, education, relative deprivation, religion, 
foreign occupation, or poverty, one encounters two problems. Firstly, many 
individuals share similar oppressive environments, but not all these people are 
radicalized. So, environmental conditions do not automatically produce radicalized 
individual. Secondly, empirical research has failed to provide a “root cause” for 
radicalisation – to find a correlation between a causal factor and an outcome, one 
would require a control group of people who have been exposed to all the potential 
factors and were not radicalized - there are common factors that have the potential, in 
certain combinations, at certain time in an individual’s life, to lead them down the 
path of radicalisation. Essentially one can say that it is neither possible nor ideal to 
define a group that is more susceptible to radicalisation – because all the commonly 
mentioned ‘causes’ may be considered a product of life, whereby not everyone 
becomes a violent radical. One can however look towards addressing problematic 
areas inherent in the aforementioned factors to reduce the potential an individual may 
have towards radicalisation. 
As long as there are people to inspire – the lonely, the lost, the wronged, the grieving, 
maybe the ill, radical ideologies may hold the answer to their challenges and the 
complications of modern life. There is no top down solution with regards to fight 
against Islamism – guns and legislation will not solve the problem. One cannot simply 
kill the head of an organisation and hope for a diminishing in its followers, this is 
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because radicalisation is born of, and breeds through an idea; and ideas cannot be 
killed. The way forward may be to allow individuals and communities to challenge, 
and question radical ideologies, whilst promoting not tolerance, but an acceptance of 
differences and the celebration of diversity.  
 
The Islamist narrative – that “the West” is engaged in a war against Islam – is a 
quintessential one. It has taken root and gained power. It has done what narratives are 
supposed to do – give ideas a way to spread…Ideas are like water: they take a while 
to reach boiling point, but as soon as they do, they erupt. We are still at the heating 
stage of our ideas; we require patience for our work to embed itself into society. Ever 
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